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TO PEEK OR NOT TO PEEK: INADVERTENT
OR UNSOLICITED DISCLOSURE OF
DOCUMENTS TO OPPOSING COUNSEL
Last night your watchdog barked all night,
So once you rose and lit the light.
It wasn't someone at your locks.
No, in your ruralletter box
I leave this note without a stamp...
And it is partly to compel
Myself, informa pauperis,
To say as much I write you this.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Attorney Anne Brown 2 is working on a complex products liability
case involving billions of dollars in damages. Her secretary just notified
her that a private investigator is in her office. From the city dump, the
investigator recovered 100 trash bags containing documents from
opposing counsel's office building. After going through the bags, the
private investigator found two documents that seem protected by the
attorney-client privilege. He hands them to Anne. Anne recognizes the
documents as ones that she asked for during discovery, but did not
receive. What should she do? 3 What are her ethical duties?
Michael Alband is an attorney working on a toxic tort case that he
knows that his client probably will not win. The overnight delivery
service person asks him to sign for an envelope. Michael realizes that the
envelope is for opposing counsel who has the same first name as his and
works in the same downtown office building. Did opposing counsel's
client mistakenly send this to him? What should he do?4 What are his
ethical duties?

I Robert Frost, An Unstamped Letter in our Rural Letter Box, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST
380,381 (1969).
2 The two situations presented in the Introduction are hypothetical and created by the
author of this Note.
3 For an explanation of Anne's professional responsibilities, see infra part TV.
4 For an explanation of Michael's professional responsibilities, see infra part IV. Some
ethics scholars believe that women's ethical behavior is different from men's ethical
behavior because feminist ethics are based on an ethics of care focusing on preserving
relationships, whereas men's behavior may be more focused on rational, abstract
principles. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and
Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & LAw 75 (1994).
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With the arrival of new technology such as fax machines and
increasingly complex litigation, inadvertent and unsolicited disclosures
of confidential or privileged documents present emerging legal issues
that bar associations and courts struggle to address.5 This Note argues
that a new Model Rule of Professional Conduct is necessary for defining
an inadvertent disclosure and unsolicited disclosure and for delineating
6
an attorney's professional responsibilities.
The American Bar Association (ABA) has not written a Model Rule
of Professional Conduct explicitly stating what an attorney's
responsibilities are when he or she receives inadvertently disclosed or
unsolicited confidential or privileged documents. 7
Currently, the
attorney who receives such documents must analyze his or her duties
and obligations by examining statutes, case law and ethics opinions
within his or her jurisdiction. 8 Despite his or her search to find an
answer, the attorney may find that within his or her jurisdiction, statutes,
case law, and ethics opinions conflict with each other as well as with
ABA Formal Opinions. 9 Currently, eleven of the seventeen state and

See Abdon M. Pallasch, Fax Cover Sheets Carry Dire Warnings for Law and Lasagna, CHI.
LAWYER, Feb. 1995, at 14 (stating that inadvertent disclosures are becoming more common
because even if an attorney has not inadvertently faxed privileged material to opposing
counsel, there is a good chance that the attorney knows someone else who has done so).
An example of wording on a fax cover sheet is that the information transmitted is intended
only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or
privileged material. Furthermore, any review, retransmission, dissemination or other use
of, or taking of any action in reliance upon this information by persons or entities other
than the intended recipient is prohibited. The cover sheet may then direct the person
receiving the fax to contact the sender.
6 The ABA Commission on Ethics and Professional Responsibility distinguished an
inadvertent disclosure of confidential materials from an unsolicited receipt of privileged or
confidential materials in that inadvertently disclosed materials appear on their face subject
to the attorney-client privilege, and the sending attorney did not intend to disclose the
materials. In an unsolicited disclosure of privileged or confidential materials, the sending
person intended the receiving attorney to receive the materials and make use of the
materials. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382 (1994).
See also Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 82
MICH. L. REV. 598, 604 (1983) (explaining that "[ilnadvertent disclosure [during] a
document production is the accidental production of a document otherwise subject to the
attorney-client privilege, whereby the adversary acquires knowledge of its contents.")
7See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
8See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
9Compare Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm., Guidance Inquiry 94-15
(1994) (deciding that where a corporate attorney had received a confidential document
inadvertently produced, the receiving attorney only had to disclose receipt of the
document to his or her client and no one else) with Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 95-59 (1995) (stating that the
5
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regional bar associations issuing one or more opinions do not follow the
ABA position. 1° States not following the ABA Formal Opinions take a
very formalistic rule-based approach." In contrast, the states that do
follow the ABA Formal Opinions place more emphasis on ethical
considerations, even though the rules of professional conduct may not

attorney-client privilege was not waived where a fax was inadvertently transmitted to
opposing counsel).
10 State and regional bar associations that do not follow the ABA Formal Opinions on
inadvertent and unsolicited disclosure of documents are Alaska, Arizona, District of
Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, Philadelphia,
and Virginia. See Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 97-1 (1997) (stating that the Alaska
Committee distinguished its opinion from the ABA Formal Opinion on unsolicited
disclosure because in the Alaska situation, the Alaska Committee decided that the person
disclosing the document had unquestionable authority to make the disclosure); Comm. on
Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Arizona, Op. 93-14 (1993) (opining that
the Arizona Committee distinguished its opinion from the ABA Formal Opinion on
inadvertent disclosure because a tape recording was left behind by the opposing spouse
and this was different from a situation where an attorney had inadvertently disclosed
privileged or confidential information). However, the dissent in the Arizona opinion stated
that it was unclear from the facts presented to the Arizona Committee whether it was an
act of the client or lawyer that the tape was left behind. Id. See District of Columbia Bar
Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 256 (1995) (stating that under District of Columbia case
law, any inadvertent disclosure of confidential documents constitutes a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege). See also infra notes 138-51 and accompanying text. See Maine
Professional Ethics Comm'n, Advisory Op. 146 (1994) (stating that the rules of evidence
and procedure permitted a receiving attorney to use an inadvertently disclosed document).
See also infra notes 152-67 and accompanying text. See Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op.
89-53 (1989) (citing no case law in the opinion and was written before the ABA Formal
Opinion on inadvertent disclosure); Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm. Ethics Op. 94-6
(1994) (citing countervailing principles for not following the ABA Formal Opinion on
inadvertent disclosure). See also, infra notes 81-101 and accompanying text. See State Bar
Ass'n of North Dakota Ethics Comm., Op. 95-14 (1995) (stating that even though the
documents disclosed contained a confidentiality clause, the documents did not disclose
confidential attorney-client information); Supreme Ct. of Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on
Grievances and Discipline, Op. 93-11 (1993) (deciding that if a lawyer obtains a copy of an
inadvertently disclosed memorandum during a public records search, there is no ethical
duty not to read the memo). The Ohio Commission stated it was not persuaded by the
ABA Formal Opinion on inadvertent disclosures because the ABA's opinion did not
address an inadvertent disclosure in the context of a public records search. Id. See
Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm., Guidance Inquiry 94-3 (1994)
(deciding that where an attorney received a misdirected fax containing a report prepared in
anticipation of litigation describing opposing counsel's assessment of liability that the
receiving attorney did not have to return the fax); Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics of the
Virginia State Bar, Op. 1076 (1988) (relying on the Virginia Code of Professional
Responsibility instead of the ABA Formal Opinion on inadvertent disclosures).
11See infra notes 152-67 and accompanying text.
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explicitly address such concerns. 12 Considerably adding to the confusion
is that some bar association and court opinions fail to distinguish an
unsolicited disclosure of documents from an inadvertent disclosure of
documents. 13 This Note proposes a Model Rule with commentary that
provides a single framework to determine this type of disclosure and to
specifically delineate professional responsibilities of the sending and
receiving attorneys. 14 The effect of this Model Rule is to provide
attorneys with clear guidelines. Clear guidelines will establish whether
the materials are protected under the attorney-client privilege or, in
certain situations, such as someone acting under a whistleblower statute,
whether the documents may be used by the receiving attorney.1 5 Clear
guidelines will also decrease litigation in this area of the law, thereby
preserving judicial resources. 16 The procedures presented in the Model
Rule will address both the sending attorney's professional
responsibilities and the receiving attorney's responsibilities. 17 This Note
urges that all states adopt this Model Rule and Comment. Adoption of a
single Model Rule will reduce forum shopping where a conflict of laws
analysis applies.18 Section II discusses the history and development of
the Model Rules. 19 This Section also discusses the ABA Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Opinions on inadvertent

12States generally following the ABA Formal Opinions on inadvertent and unsolicited

disclosure are Florida, Kentucky, Montana, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. See infra
note
63 and accompanying text.
13
See infra part lf.B.
14 See infra part IV.
IsId.
16See Marc S. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986)
(discussing that increasing litigation has caused great cost to the nation). "America has
suffered a hypertrophy of its legal institutions." Id. at 4.
17See infra part IV.
18See, e.g., ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 11:12 (1995) (stating

that "[n]o area of local rulemaking has been more fragmented than local rules governing
attorney conduct"). The local ethical standards of the state where the district is located are
usually adopted. Id. Additionally, the fragmentation of the local rules affect major federal
agencies, including the Department of Justice, civil rights groups, and large law firms
involved in multidistrict litigation. Id. Furthermore, legal malpractice suits have "'led to
subsidiary disputes about choice of law-often of mind numbing complexity.'" Id.
19See infra part II.A. This Note will not address situations where the receiving lawyer is
involved in soliciting or procuring privileged or confidential materials from former
employees of an adverse party. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 359 (1991) (prohibiting a lawyer from seeking privileged information from
former employees of an adverse party during ex parte interviews); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 (1998) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging "in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation... [and engaging] in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.").
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and unsolicited disclosure of privileged or confidential documents. 20 In
addition, Section II also contains discussions of the attorney-client
privilege. 21 Section M of this Note analyzes policy considerations of
inadvertent and unsolicited disclosures. 22 Also analyzed are the state bar
associations and the court opinions that failed to distinguish between an
inadvertent disclosure and an unsolicited disclosure of privileged or
confidential documents. 23 An additional factor analyzed is the different
procedures promulgated by bar associations. 24 Also presented is an
analysis of the different remedies fashioned by courts. 25 This Section
highlights the need for a single Model Rule addressing inadvertent and
unsolicited disclosure of privileged or confidential documents and
procedures attorneys should follow. 26 Section IV proposes a Model Rule
of Professional Conduct with commentary that provides a single
framework addressing inadvertent and unsolicited disclosures of
27
privileged or confidential documents.
II.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF MODEL RULES AND ETHICS OPINIONS

Before examining state and regional bar association and court
opinions concerning inadvertent disclosure or unsolicited disclosure of
documents, one must begin by briefly examining legal ethics. The first
section traces the history of legal ethics in the context of the development
of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The second section
presents two recent ABA Formal Opinions, one on inadvertent
disclosure and the other on the unsolicited disclosure of privileged and
confidential documents. The last section discusses the attorney-client
privilege, including how courts examine the privilege in light of an
inadvertent disclosure.

2

0 See infra part

ll.B.
infra part Bl.C.
See infra part llI.A.

21 See

2

23See infra part lI].B.
24See infra part IlI.C.
25See infra part lI.C.
26
Additionally, the importance and need for a new Model Rule was highlighted by a recent
ABA survey at the 1997 annual meeting where thirty-nine percent of lawyers said they had
received a misdirected document and of this thirty-nine percent, less than seventy-five
percent had returned the document to opposing counsel even though this is contrary to
ABA Formal Opinion procedures. ABA/BNA MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 13:15

(1997).
27

See infra part IV.
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History and Development of the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct

The legal profession is unique from most other professions because
it is defined by ethical considerations within a framework of what is
legal. 28 Historically, in 1897, as part of a movement to establish
standards of character, education, and training for lawyers, the Alabama
Bar Association developed the first Code of Professional Ethics. 29 Eleven
years later, in 1908, the ABA adopted its first ethical code, entitled the
Canons of Professional Ethics. 3° In 1969, the ABA replaced these early
31
Canons with the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
Subsequently, almost every state adopted the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility in one form or another. 32 Then in 1983, the

2 See DAVID E. SCHRADER, ETHICS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW iv (1988). Professor Schrader
contends that as compared to other professions "the purpose of the legal profession is
bound up from the beginning with questions of social morality." Id. Furthermore,
Professor Schrader states that ethical constraints on an attorney's behavior are determined
by the roles that the attorney plays in the system. Id. See also Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal
Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 319 (1987). However, Professor Shaffer
explains that legal ethics is different from ethics because legal ethics is thinking about the
morals of someone else over whom the attorney has power, whereas ethics is thinking
about morals. Id. See also Don J. Young & Louise L. Hill, Professionalism: The Necessity for
Internal Control, 61 TEM'. L. REV. 205, 207 (1988). Judge Young and Professor Hill discuss
the philosophy that the pursuit of victory at all costs should never be entertained by the
legal profession. Id. at 205. Also, the authors state that lawyers cannot strive only for their
clients' victories because the end never justifies the means. Id.
29 See CODE OF ETHICS, ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (1899), reprinted in HENRY S.
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 353 (1953) (stating "[t]he purity and efficiency of judicial
administration, which, under our system, is largely government itself, depend as much
upon the character, conduct, and demeanor of attorneys in this great trust, as upon the
fidelity and learning of courts or the honesty and intelligence of juries").
30See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, vii (1997) (stating that the Canons were
largely based on the previous Alabama Bar Association's Code of Professional Ethics).
31See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement (1980). The
Code consists of Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. Id. The Canons
are statements of norms expressed in general terms stating the standards of professional
conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with "the public, with the legal system,
and with the legal profession. " Id. The Ethical Considerations are aspirational objectives.
Id. The Disciplinary Rules are mandatory. Id. See also Ronald D. Rotunda, The Lawyer's
Ethical Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Unethical Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U.
ILL. L. REV. 977, 980 (stating that the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility was written
in more statutory terms than the Canons). The ABA did not consider the Model Code as
binding on its members after the Department of Justice brought antitrust charges against
the ABA. Id. at 980-81. Furthermore, "the ABA withdrew the Model Code in 1983 and it is
no longer official ABA policy." Letter from Peter Geraghty, Director, ETHICSearch,
American Bar Association, to Gloria Kristopek, author (January 9, 1998) (on file with
author).
3 See MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROBLEMS INLEGAL ETHICS 40 (1997) (stating that the
ABA promulgated the Model Code as a model for states to adopt). But see Walter P.
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ABA once again updated lawyers' ethical duties by enacting the Model
3
Rules of Professional Conduct as developed by the Kutak Commission.
State and federal courts look to the ABA Model Code and Model Rules
to provide guidelines for regulating the conduct of lawyers. 34 The ethical
standards imposed upon attorneys in a federal court are a matter of
federal law.-s Federal courts rely on the Model Rules to provide an
appropriate standard of ethical conduct for attorneys. 36 But, in state
courts, the binding disciplinary rules are those adopted by the state
supreme courts and are usually based on either the ABA Model Code or
the ABA Model Rules. 37 Before examining some state ethical standards
and opinions, some background on the ABA Formal Opinions is
provided.

Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063, 1069 (1978) (explaining that
President Powell of the ABA indicated that the Model Code was inadequate because the

areas of availability of legal services, trial publicity, and representation of unpopular causes
were not addressed).
3 See JOHN S. DzIENKOWsKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES
3 (1997). "The model rules follow a UCC or restatement-like approach by placing the rule
of professional responsibility in text and including elaborative material in the comments."
ld. See also STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS xxii (1997) (stating that the Kutak Commission was named after Robert J.
Kutak, who chaired the commission charged with preparing the Model Rules).
Additionally, "the ABA Model Rules are advisory only. The ethics rules, laws and court
decisions of the individual jurisdiction are controlling." Letter from Peter Geraghty,
Director, ETHICSearch, American Bar Association, to Gloria Kristopek, author (January 9,
1998) (on file with author).
3 See Figueroa-Olmo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 616 F. Supp. 1445, 1450 (D.P.R. 1985)
(adopting ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168
(1986) (invoking Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2, Rule 3.3 and Comment to
Rule 3.3).
35See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643-45 (1985) (stating that courts have long recognized an
inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers and their power is derived from the
lawyer's role as an officer of the court). See also Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir.
1964) (stating that an attorney appearing in federal court is acting as an officer of the court
and it is that court that must judge his conduct).
36States and territories that have adopted a version of the Model Rules are: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virgin Islands, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. ABA/BNA MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr 01:3
(1997).
37 Telephone interview with Peter Geraghty, Director, ETHICSearch, American Bar
Association, (March 11, 1998).
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ABA Formal Opinions on the Inadvertent and Unsolicited Disclosure of
Documents

The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility relies
on Model Rules when providing nonbinding Formal Opinions. 38 In
drafting the Formal Opinions concerning the inadvertent or unsolicited
disclosure of privileged or confidential materials, the ABA Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility relied on Model Rule 1.6. 39 In the

38 See ROBERT H. ARONSON & DONALD

T.

WECKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A

NUTSHELL 37 (2d ed. 1991). The American Bar Association and state and regional bar
associations have committees that render opinions on questions of legal ethics. Id. When
new, significant, or recurring questions are posed, the committee may render a formal
opinion. Id. at 38. See also MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL, PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 41
(1997) (stating that some ethics opinions are published and some are not). Also, the ABA
and state and local bar associations provide telephone advice concerning ethical questions.
Id.
3
9See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382 (1994). See also MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998). The text of Model Rule 1.6 is:
Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation,
except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to
a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct
in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
Id.
See also CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 48 (1987) (explaining that much of the debate concerning
Model Rule 1.6 focused on the conflicting interests of the lawyer, client, and the public);
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERs §§ 113-177A (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
1996) (permitting an attorney to reveal a client's confidential information where it will
advance the client's interests, and if needed, to prevent death or serious bodily injury
whether caused by a crime or other events and whether caused by the client or someone
else); CODE OF ETHICS, ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (1899), reprinted in HENRY S.
DRIKER, LEGAL ETHICS 352 (1953) (stating that one of the duties of attorneys is to
"maintain inviolate the confidence, and, at every peril to themselves, to preserve the secrets
of their clients"). See also James Podgers, Model Rules Get the Once-over, 83 A.B.A. J. 90
(1997) (discussing the Ethics 2000 Project which will review and study the current Model
Rules). Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey of the Delaware Supreme Court has placed Model
Rule 1.6 near the top of the list for the commission to review. Id.
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Formal Opinion on the inadvertent disclosure of confidential materials,
the ABA Committee examined the circumstances where it was clear that
the materials were not intended for the receiving lawyer. 4° Generally,
the ABA Committee has decided that when documents are inadvertently
disclosed and the receiving attorney knows that the documents are
privileged or confidential, the attorney should not review the disclosed
materials or review them only to the extent required to determine how to
proceed. 41 Also, the receiving attorney should notify opposing counsel
of receipt of materials and follow opposing counsel's instructions. 42
The ABA Committee stated that the procedure it has promulgated
fosters the principle of confidentiality and avoids punishing the sending
attorney's client who is innocent. 43 The ABA Committee distinguished
its Formal Opinion on inadvertent disclosure of privileged or
confidential materials from its Formal Opinion on unsolicited disclosure
of privileged or confidential materials by stating that in the former, the
sending party did not intend to transmit the privileged or confidential
materials to the receiving lawyer.44 In the situation of an unsolicited
disclosure, the ABA Committee assumed that the unauthorized sender
intended the receiving lawyer to receive and make use of the materials. 45
Furthermore, in the unsolicited disclosure situation, the ABA
Committee developed slightly different procedures because the person
disclosing the documents is trying to rectify unjust or improper conduct,
such as the failure to disclose the documents called for in a production

40ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992). The ABA

Committee discussed one situation where the sending lawyer had notified the receiving
lawyer of the inadvertent transmission and had requested return of the materials sent. Id.
In another situation, the ABA Committee discussed a fact pattern where the sending
lawyer and his client did not know that the materials were missent. Id.
41Id. The ABA Committee also stated that the Model Rules require a positive view toward
the importance of maintaining confidentiality. Id.
42 Id. The ABA Committee also stated that its decision was not based on "a narrow,
literalistic reading of the black letter of the Model Rules," but that in making its decision, it
looked at the precepts underlying the Model Rules. Id. See also CODE OF ETHICS, ALABAMA
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (1899), reprinted in HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 353 (1953)
(stating that no one rule will determine a lawyer's duty in every case).
3 68
43ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
(1992).
44 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382 (1994). In its
opinion, the ABA Committee referenced state ethics opinions not following the ABA view.
Id. These were the Maryland Bar Association, the Virginia Bar Association, and the
Michigan Bar Association. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
45ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992).
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request. 46 In contrast to the inadvertent disclosure Formal Opinion, the
Committee determined that in the unsolicited disclosure situation, the
attorney may be able to use the documents even though the sender has
no authority to disclose the documents. 47 The ABA Committee
determined that an example of a legitimate claim where a lawyer may
use such documents is where documents were received from someone
acting under a whistleblower statute.48 The inadvertent disclosure of
privileged or confidential documents and whether the attorney-client
privilege is waived is presented in the next section.
C.

Court Decisions Considering Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and
Inadvertent Disclosures

Before examining whether the attorney-client privilege has been
waived in an inadvertent disclosure, the attorney-client privilege in
general must be discussed. Privileges protect the privacy of certain
relationships and encourage the free flow of information.49 The policy
consideration behind the attorney-client privilege is that without a
privilege, clients may withhold information attorneys need to effectively
represent his or her cients ° The attorney-client privilege is an
evidentiary rule protecting confidential communication between an

46ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382 (1994). However,
the Committee said that a lawyer receiving such materials may not make unlimited use of
the materials and may have some responsibilities when receiving such materials. Id.
47ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382 (1994). But see In
re Shell Oil Refinery, 143 F.R.D. 105 (E.D. La. 1992) (prohibiting the receiving adverse party

from using confidential documents belonging to an employer that were unauthorized to be
disclosed by a current employee).
48 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382 (1994). See
Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (1988) (stating that the purpose of the Act "is
to strengthen and improve protection for the rights of Federal employees, to prevent
reprisals, and to help eliminate wrongdoing within the Government by...mandating that

employees should not suffer adverse consequences as a result of prohibited personnel
practices.")
49See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5.1 (1995). Also, in
important professional relationships, privileges are justified to protect privacy, freedom,
honor, and trust. Id.
See also GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 437 (1996) (stating
that privileged communications are protected because society has deemed the principle or
relationship worthy of preserving and fostering.)
50 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (stating that the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is to encourage full and frank communication between lawyers
and their clients). The Court further stated that recognition of the privilege must be done
on a case-by-case basis. Id. See also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 49, at § 5.1 (stating
that critics have said that the attorney-client privilege interferes with the fact-finding

process).
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attorney and client.51 In contrast, the duty of confidentiality is an ethical
duty enforced independently of the law of evidentiary privilege. 52 That
is, the attorney-client privilege comes into place in the litigation context
where the client seeks to exclude documents or testimony on the basis
that it is privileged.5 3 Confidentiality applies to all situations, such as a
lawyer discussing a case with his family or friends. This type of
violation can expose the lawyer to professional discipline such as
disbarment.%
Courts are split as to whether the attorney-client privilege is waived
by an inadvertent disclosure of privileged or confidential documents.

51See

MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 49, at § 5.1 (stating that privileges are unique in
evidence law because they impede the search for truth by excluding evidence that may be
highly probative.) There is wide variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction concerning the
scope of privileges. Id. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-4
(1983) ("The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer
to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept, unlike the
evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of information or the
fact that others share the knowledge."); CODE OF ETHICS, ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
(1899), reprinted in HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 356 (1953) (stating that the confidence
and communications between a lawyer and attorney are "the property and secrets of the
client, and can not be divulged, except at his instance").
52
See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt 5 (1983) (stating that
the principle of confidentiality is found in two bodies of law). The first is the attorneyclient privilege in the law of evidence which applies to judicial or other proceedings where
an attorney may be called as a witness or the attorney may be required to produce evidence
concerning a client. Id. The second is that the confidentiality rule applies to matters
communicated in confidence by the client and all information relating to the
representation. Id. An attorney may not disclose confidential information except as
required or authorized by law or the Rules of Professional Conduct. Id.
w See David S. Smallman, The Purloined Communications Exception to Inadvertent Waiver:
Internet Publicationand Preservationof Attorney-Client Privilege, 32 TORTS & INS. L.J. 715, 720

(1997).
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is
or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the
communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his
[or her] subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is

acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the
attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of

strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion
on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding,
and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id.
5
1 See MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL, PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 42 (1997) (discussing that
discipline is a punishment or penalty imposed by a disciplinary agency on an attorney who
has breached a professional ethics rule). Disbarment is the most serious type of discipline
and can mean permanent removal from the practice of law. Id.
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There are three views regarding whether the privilege continues after an
inadvertent disclosure occurs.55 The first view is that the privilege is
automatically lost upon disclosure.% The courts following this view hold
that the attorney-client privilege is waived by any voluntary disclosure
57
even though there was no intent to waive the attorney-client privilege.
The rationale behind this view is that once a privileged communication
is in a third party's possession, the confidentiality is lost and cannot be
restored.5 8 The second view is that the attorney-client privilege is not
waived by an inadvertent disclosure of documents.5 9 The reasoning
behind this view is that the client is the holder of the privilege and that
an act by his or her attorney cannot constitute a waiver. 6° Furthermore, a

John T. Hundley, Waiver of Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent Disclosure-StateLaw, 51
A.L.R.5th 603 (1997) (compiling a comprehensive state-by-state analysis of waiver of
attorney-client privilege with an inadvertent release of privileged information). See also
Thomas J. Leach, Loss of Attorney-Client Privilege Through Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged
Documents, in ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LrIGATION 119 (Vincent S. Walkowiak
ed., 2d. ed. 1997). Inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents is most common during
the pretrial production of documents. Id at 119. See also Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v.
Swiss-Bemina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Il. 1981) (discussing that privileged documents that
were taken from a trash dumpster were no longer privileged).
56 See Leach, supra note 55, at 124 (discussing that some courts favor this test because the
privilege acts as an obstacle to the discovery of the truth). Also, courts favor this strict view
because mistake is a euphemism for negligence and one is expected to pay for one's
negligence. Id. Additionally, some courts favor a strict view because it forces selfregulatory behavior. Id. at 125. See also Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber
Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970) (stating that when the document was produced for
inspection, it entered the public domain.) The confidentiality was breached and there was
no continuing basis for the privilege. Id. See also Int'l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 449 (D. Mass 1988) (stating that the privilege was waived for
inadvertently disclosed documents because the disclosing party failed to take adequate
precautions to preserve the privilege).
57 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976,980 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding that the privilege was
waived by an inadvertent disclosure whether or not the waiver was voluntary or
inadvertent).
55See, e.g., Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C.
1970) (stating that once the document was produced for inspection, the confidentiality was
breached and the privilege was destroyed).
59 See, e.g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(stating that there was no waiver of the privilege in an inadvertent disclosure because only
the client can waive the privilege); Mendenhall v. Barber-Green Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955
(N.D. M. 1982) (stating that waiver must be an intentional abandonment or relinquishment
of a right and courts should require more than just negligence by an attorney before it can
be said that the client has given up the privilege).
60 See Thomas J. Leach, Loss of Attorney-Client Privilege Through Inadvertent Disclosure of
Privileged Documents, in ATrORNEY-CLENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LmGATION 119,129 (Vincent
S. Walkowiak ed., 2d. ed. 1997) (stating that the practical advantage of this approach is that
it is easy to apply).
55See
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client must intentionally abandon or relinquish a known right. 61 The
third view presents several factors courts use to determine whether an
inadvertent disclosure constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege. 62 The factors are the reasonableness of the precautions taken
by the sending party to prevent the disclosure, the time the sending
party took to rectify the error, the scope of discovery, the extent of the
disclosure by the sending party, and the overriding issues of fairness. 63
Even though many modern courts generally follow the third view,
courts have fashioned different remedies when applying these same
64
factors to inadvertent disclosure cases.
Thus, this conflict and confusion between different state and
regional bar associations, the ABA, and courts shows the need for a
single Model Rule. One Model Rule will clearly establish the difference
between an inadvertent and unsolicited disclosure and delineate an
attorney's professional responsibilities. 65 An analysis of the ABA and
state and court opinions presented in the next section will show the
shortcomings of the two ABA Formal Opinions and the need for a single
Model Rule.
Ill. LEGAL ANALYSIS
This Section analyzes ABA, state bar associations, and court
opinions concerning inadvertent and unsolicited disclosures. Competing
legal principles concerning inadvertent and unsolicited disclosures are
compared first. Next, state bar association opinions and cases failing to
distinguish between an inadvertent and unsolicited disclosure are
discussed.
Finally, procedures of bar associations and remedies
fashioned by courts are analyzed.

61See Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 954 (stating that an inadvertent production of documents
is the antithesis of a waiver).
62 See Patricia M. Worthy, The Impact of New and Emerging Telecommunications Technologies:A
Call to the Rescue of the Attorney-client Privilege, 39 HOW. L.J. 437, 461 (1996) (stating that the
privilege is waived only if the disclosing party failed to take reasonable precautions to
maintain confidentiality of the documents).
63 See Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, 116 F.R.D.
46,50 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (stating that inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document is one
of the factors to be considered in an inadvertent disclosure of documents).
6See infra notes 168-86 and accompanying text.
65
See generally part IV.
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Competing Legal Principles

Competing legal principles and underlying policy issues must be
examined by bar associations and courts when determining professional
responsibilities of attorneys regarding inadvertent or unsolicited
disclosure of documents. 66 In an inadvertent disclosure situation, a
tension exists between protecting confidences of the sending attorney's
client versus promoting zealous representation of a client by the
receiving attorney. 67 The ABA, in its Formal Opinion on inadvertent
disclosure, strongly supports the interests of the sending attorney's
cient. 68 The ABA promotes the underlying policy of protecting the

an Advisory Opinion, the South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee stated that
with electronic mail, there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy when sending
confidential information. See South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 97-08 (1997).
The Committee also noted that the lawyer owes a duty of reasonable care to keep the
information confidential. Id. The Committee went on to state that the attorney should
discuss with the client options, such as encryption, to safeguard against the inadvertent
disclosure of sensitive or privileged information sent by electronic mail. Id. See, e.g.,
AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule
1.6 (1983) (discussing that with the advent of new technology, ideas about privacy are
changing). The Committee also discussed is that the popularity of the internet, facsimile
machines, cellular telephone, cordless phones, and other devices will challenge an
attorney's ability to maintain confidentiality of client's confidences. Id. Furthermore, in the
future, an attorney's professional responsibilities may expand to include protection of
storage of electronic communication. Id.
67 See Joseph S. Stuart, Comment, Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Information: What
Does a CaliforniaLawyer Need to Know?, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 547,577 (1997) (stating that
even though lawyers perform in an adversarial setting and are required to zealously
represent their client, lawyers should still behave with integrity). The author further makes
the point that attorneys should consider ethics because society is skeptical of the legal
profession. Id. In contrast, zealous representation of clients is promoted by the District of
Columbia Bar Association. See infra notes 138-151 and accompanying text.
(A See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992). See
also Comm. on Professional Ethics Florida State Bar Ass'n, Op. 93-3 (1994) (stating that an
attorney who receives confidential documents inadvertently disclosed is obliged to notify
the sender). The sender then can decide whether to take further action. Id. The Committee
described situations in which an inadvertent disclosure might take place, including during
a document production, a misdirected electronic mail transmission or facsimile
transmission, an envelope switched during mailing, or instructions concerning distribution
that are misunderstood. Id. See also Kentucky Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm,, Op. E-374 (1995)
(stating that lawyers should follow the ABA Formal Opinion on inadvertent disclosure)
However, the Kentucky Committee then stated that in the absence of controlling case law,
a lawyer may, at risk of disqualification, notify the sending attorney that the receiving
attorney intends to claim the inadvertent waiver. Id. The Committee further opined that
the materials should be returned to the sending attorney. Id. See also North Carolina State
Bar, Op. RPC 252 (1997) (stating that the receiving attorney should refrain from examining
inadvertently disclosed materials and return the materials to the sending attorney). See also
Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
6In
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client's confidences because this allows the client to disclose all necessary
information to his or her attorney. 69 This in turn allows the attorney to
best represent his or her client. 70 Also, by preserving the client's
confidences, the client is not paying a penalty for a mere slip by his or
her attorney mistakenly releasing confidential information. 1
In contrast, state bar associations promote the zealous
representation of the client by the receiving attorney over a duty of
confidentiality to the sending attorney and client. 72
Zealous
representation is promoted by state bar association ethics committees
because these committees advise receiving attorneys that they can
examine and use the disclosed documents.73 Furthermore, some ethics

Op. 95-101A (1995) (stating that the attorney should follow procedures outlined
Formal Opinion on inadvertent disclosure).
69 See

in the

ABA

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op, 368 (1992). But
see Joanne Pitulla, Return to Sender, 79 A.B.A. J 110 (1993) (criticizing the ABA Formal
Opinion on inadvertent disclosure because it does not address situations where the
lawyer's own client intentionally intercepts confidential documents and gives them to his
or her attorney); William T. Barker, What About Inadvertently Disclosed Documents or
Information?, 60 DEF. COUNSEL J. 613, 615 (1993) (stating that in most situations, the
receiving attorney has read to some extent the privileged or confidential information before
realizing that the material is privileged).
70 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. (1992). See also
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER's ETHICS 87 (1990) (stating that in order
to effectively represent a client, an attorney must know all relevant facts and a client is not
likely to disclose these facts unless the client is assured that the attorney will maintain the
information in confidence). See also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1980)
(stating that the broader public interest in observance of the law and administration of
justice is promoted by observing the attorney-client privilege).
71 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. (1992). See also
Stuart, supra note 67, at 569 (stating that if the attorney-client privilege is waived by an
inadvertent disclosure, the client then becomes "lost in the shuffle"). By waiving the
privilege, the receiving attorney receives a substantial benefit from a mere clerical error. Id.
n See infra notes 138-151 and accompanying text.
See MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYER'S ETHICS 71 (1990) (stating that the Model Code promotes more
of an obligation for an attorney to act zealously in representing his or her client as
compared to the Model Rules). An example of extreme zealous representation by an
attorney is chronicled in re McAlevy, 354 A.2d 289, 290 (N.J. 1976). In this case, after
exchanging words, one attorney flew into a rage and attacked another attorney in the
courtroom. Id.
73
See infra notes 138-151 and accompanying text. See State Bar Ass'n of North Dakota, Op.
95-14 (1995) (deciding that an inadvertently disclosed document may be used by opposing
counsel in a personal injury action.). See also State Bar of Michigan, CI-970 (1983) (deciding
that an attorney who came into possession of an internal document of the opposing party
could use the document while deposing an officer of the opposing party to impeach the
credibility of a witness.) The Michigan Committee determined that the attorney would not
violate the Code of Professional Responsibility by using the document as long as it was
admissible as evidence. Id. Compare Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics of the Virginia State
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committees advise the receiving attorney that they need not notify the
sending attorney that he or she received the documents. 74 This advice
raises the issue that the receiving attorney is given an unfair strategic
advantage over the sending attorney.75
In contrast, in a different Formal Opinion on unsolicited disclosures,
the ABA decided that in limited circumstances, the receiving attorney
may have a legitimate claim to the documents. 76 In this situation, the
ABA Committee decided that the public policy considerations of
protecting the public welfare and safety may outweigh confidentiality.77

Bar, Op. 1076 (1988) (stating that there was nothing in the Code of Professional
Responsibility requiring return of unsolicited materials or prohibiting the receiving
attorney from reading and using the materials to his or her client's advantage) with
Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics of the Virginia State Bar, Op. 1583 (1994) (deciding that
where a judge had mailed back a letter to a lawyer and had inadvertently included a
document concerning a court record of a putative conviction, the subject of the inquiry, that
the attorney must immediately return the document to the judge). The Virginia Committee
further opined that failure to do so would violate the Disciplinary Rules and applicable
Virginia statutes. Id.
74See Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 97-1, (1997) (deciding that where a party in a
divorce case intentionally mailed a copy of a confidential letter from her attorney to the
opposing attorney, the opposing attorney has no obligation to notify opposing counsel
because there is no Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct controlling this situation); Ethics
Comm. for the Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 89-53 (1989) (deciding that where an
attorney had received copies of documents from an anonymous source concerning business
records of the opponent, that it was not the obligation of the receiving attorney to notify the
court, opposing party, or any other third parties of receipt of the documents). However,
the Maryland Committee further stated that if the documents were requested from the
receiving attorney during discovery, the receiving attorney may have an obligation to
produce copies of the documents. Id.
7
5 See Daniel DeVito, Oops!: Dealingwith the Inadvertent Disclosureof Privileged Documents in
a High-Tech World, 9 J. OF PROPRIETARY RIGHTS 2 (1997) (stating that misdirected
information may be "the single most important factor influencing the ultimate outcome of
the case").
76 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382 (1994). Also, the
Committee noted that under state law, there may be situations such as criminal activity
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm where the receiving attorney
probably should not notify opposing counsel. Id. In this instance, the attorney may have to
consult law enforcement authorities or a court. Id. Also, the Committee noted that an
attorney under state law may have to contact law enforcement authorities or a court where
the disclosed documents appear to reveal ongoing crime or fraud that opposing counsel
may be assisting. Id. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.6(b) (1998)
(providing instances when a lawyer may reveal confidential information such as
preventing a client from committing a criminal act likely to result in substantial bodily
harm or imminent death); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUC Rule 1.2(d) (1998)
(providing that a lawyer shall not assist a client to engage in criminal or fraudulent
conduct).
77 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382 (1994).
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State bar associations have failed to address these considerations. 78
Therefore, because of this incongruency and failure of the states to
address competing policy concerns, a Model Rule is needed to take these
competing policies into consideration. As an effort to respond to this
incongruency, it is essential to examine state bar associations and court
opinions.
B.

State Bar Association Opinions and Cases Failing to Distinguish Between
Inadvertentand Unsolicited Disclosureof Documents

The Massachusetts Bar Association and the Montana Bar
Association are two examples of state bar associations failing to
distinguish between the inadvertent disclosure and unsolicited
disclosure of documents.79 Additionally, the federal district court for the
District of Columbia also failed to distinguish between an inadvertent or
unsolicited disclosure of privileged or confidential documentss 0 The
following Subsections discuss these opinions and then analyze the same
facts presented in these opinions using the ABA Formal Opinions.
Further, these examples illustrate the shortcomings of having two ABA
Formal Opinions instead of one Model Rule providing a single
framework for guidance.
1.

Bar Association Opinions

The Ethics Committee of the Massachusetts Bar Association
discussed a situation where a former corporate manager without
authorization took or copied corporate documents apparently covered
by the attorney-client privilege, and provided these documents to a
government regulatory body.81 The regulatory body then provided the
See infra notes 81-113, 138-167 and accompanying text.
See Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 94-6 (1994); Ethics Comm. of the
State Bar of Montana, Op. 951229 (1995). See infra notes 81-113 and accompanying text.
80
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Arch Mineral Corp., 145 F.R.D. 3 (D.D.C. 1992). See infra
notes 114-120 and accompanying text.
81 Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 94-6 (1994). See also International
Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip., 120 F.R.D. 445 (D. Mass. 1988) (showing that part of the
Committee's analysis was based on this case where the court decided that the inadvertently
disclosed documents did not have to be returned). The court did not issue a protective
order to prohibit the defendant from using the documents because the court stated that the
order would not restore the confidential nature of the documents. Id. at 449. The court
found that the inadvertent disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege because the
purpose of the privilege, to protect confidentiality, has been lost. Id. at 450. See also NLRB
v. Monfort, Inc. reported in ABA/BNA MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr 8:15 (1993)
(where a special federal master ruled that a lawyer who had inadvertently faxed a memo to
a internal federal agency need not return the memo to the agency).
78

79
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documents to a government attorney. 82 Significantly, the Massachusetts
Committee stated that even though the documents were not
inadvertently disclosed by the informant, that the Committee would
follow an inadvertent disclosure analysis.s 3
The Massachusetts
Committee opined that the result of its analysis was the same. 84
Suprisingly, even though the Massachusetts Committee analyzed
the facts as an inadvertent disclosure, the Committee distinguished its
opinion from the ABA Formal Opinion on inadvertent disclosure. 85 The
Massachusetts Committee did not follow the ABA Formal Opinion on
inadvertent disclosure in its analysis because the Committee stated that
important countervailing principles outweighed the importance of
confidentiality. 86 The countervailing principles that the Massachusetts
Committee cited were that regulatory and law enforcement agencies
protect important public interests, and government lawyers are under a
duty to investigate possible violations of the law.87 Moreover, the
Massachusetts Committee stated that once the agency personnel had
88
read the documents, the information was no longer confidential.

82

Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 94-6 (1994). See also In re Sealed Case,
877 F.2d 976,981 (1989) (finding that the company's inadvertent disclosure of one memo to

a government agency constituted a waiver of the attorney-client privilege). The court left
open the question of whether the waiver of the attorney-client extended to other
documents of the same subject matter. Id.
3
9 Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 94-6 (1994).
84 However, in the opinion, the Massachusetts Committee failed to state why the analysis

was the same. Id.
95Id.
8Id.
7 Id. But see infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
8 Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 94-6 (1994). See also Ray v. Cutter
Lab., 746 F. Supp. 86 (D. Fla. 1990) (stating that even though a memo is protected by the
attorney-client privilege, disclosure, either inadvertent or intentional waives the privilege);
John T. Hundley, Annotation, Waiver of Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent Disdosure-State
Law, 51 A.L.I5th 603 (1997) (discussing that where governmental agencies have
encouraged submission of information that is privileged, the person or company
submitting the information has some expectation of leniency and the confidential nature of
the information will be protected). However, if the government must bring an enforcement
action against the disclosing company, the privilege may be lost except as against private
plaintiffs. Id. See also Ares-Serono, Inc. v. Organon Int'l B.V., 160 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D. Mass. 1994)
(stating that disclosure of documents operates as a waiver to the attorney-client privilege
where the documents are disclosed inadvertently). The court applied this reasoning in
finding that an alleged infringer waived confidentiality of foreign patent application by an
inadvertent disclosure. Id. See also Draus v. Healthtrust, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 384, 388 (S.D. Ind.
1997) (finding waiver of attorney-client privilege where the letter was inadvertently
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Alternatively, if the Massachusetts Committee had modeled its
analysis on the ABA Formal Opinions concerning inadvertent
disclosures and unsolicited disclosures, the first pertinent inquiry the
Massachusetts Committee should have made was whether the facts lent
themselves to an inadvertent disclosure or an unsolicited disclosure
analysis. 89 Based on the facts of the situation, the Massachusetts
Committee should have determined that this was an unsolicited
disclosure situation rather than an inadvertent disclosure because the
corporate manager acted as an informant.9
The corporate manager
provided copies of documents to a government regulatory agency that
were later given to a government attorney.91
In this situation, if the Massachusetts Committee had followed the
ABA Formal Opinion on unsolicited disclosure, the Committee would
have examined the important issue of whether the receiving attorney
had a legitimate claim to the documents under a whistleblower statute. 92
Under the ABA Formal Opinion, the Massachusetts Committee could
have determined that the informant was acting under the authority of a
whistleblower statute and was thus protected by a state or federal
whistleblower statute. 93 Had the Massachusetts Committee relied on the
ABA Formal Opinion on unsolicited disclosure, the Massachusetts
Committee may have found that the attorney had a right to use the
materials even though the sender had no authority to disclose the
documents. 94

disclosed). The court found that the privilege was waived because the letter was disclosed
to persons who had no duty to maintain confidentiality. Id.
89See generallypart IV.
90 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382 (1994); James
Podgers, PrivilegedMaterialsneed Discussion,81 A.B.A. J. 79 (1995) (discussing that receipt of
unsolicited materials protected by opposing counsel's attorney-client privilege is not an
ethics violation).
91
Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 94-6 (1994).
92 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382 (1994).
93 Massachusetts has recently adopted the ABA Model Rules with amendments that are
effective January 1, 1998. ABA/BNA MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 13:11 (1997).
Massachusetts has a whistleblower statute stating that an employer cannot take retaliatory
action against an employee because the employee discloses to a supervisor or public official
a policy or practice that the employee reasonably believes is a violation of the law. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 149 § 185 (1997). The facts are unclear whether the government attorney
was a federal or state attorney. Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 94-6

(1994).
94 See

generally part IV.
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However, because the Massachusetts Committee determined that it
did not have to distinguish between an inadvertent disclosure and an
unsolicited disclosure, the Committee failed to address these important
issues in its analysis.95 Instead, the Massachusetts Committee cited
countervailing public interests in determining that the government
attorney could examine the confidential documents, thus failing to
address the third party's right to protection under a whistleblower act.9
Also, because the Massachusetts Committee determined that it was not a
violation of the Disciplinary Rules for a government lawyer to possess
and use the disclosed documents, and that the government lawyer did
not have to notify opposing counsel that the government lawyer had
received the documents, the Massachusetts Committee may have given
the government attorney an unfair strategic advantage. 7 Likewise, by
failing to follow the ABA Formal Opinion on unsolicited disclosure, the
Massachusetts Committee did not recommend that the parties petition a
court to make a definitive resolution on the proper disposition of the
documents. 98
In contrast, under the ABA Formal Opinion on unsolicited
disclosure, the ABA recommends that the sending party be notified that

95

Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 94-6 (1994).

961d.

See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992)
(describing other situations where opposing counsel may have a chance to "take
advantage" of confidential information, such as an attorney examining another attorney's
briefcase during a lunch break or one attorney reading a file inadvertently left behind by
opposing counsel). See also KondakJian v. Port Authority of N.Y. and N. J., No.
94Civ8013(AGS)(DEF), 1996 WL 139782, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (concurring with the
approach taken by the ABA Committee on inadvertent disclosures and discussing an
unwillingness to permit attorneys to capitalize on errors such as one attorney reviewing
another attorney's notes inadvertently left in a conference room during a break). The court
further stated that the receiving attorney should notify the sending attorney of an
inadvertent fax because obligations to do so arise out of the disciplinary rules prohibiting
attorneys from engaging in conduct involving fraud, dishonesty, deceit, or
misrepresentation. Id. at *6. See also Heidi L. McNeil & Christopher J. Littlefield, The
Inadvertent Disclosure of PrivilegedDocuments, 30 ARiZ. Ar'Y 10,11 (1993) (stating that many
times, the attorney only becomes aware that documents have been inadvertently disclosed
when opposing counsel begins to question the attorney's client during a deposition); Jeff
Barge, Law Firms Take Document Blooper Battles to Court,81 A.B.A. J. 22 (1995) (discussing i
case where Baltimore Circuit Judge Marshall A. Levin required selection of a new jury
because a secretary had accidentally faxed papers about juror selection strategy to
opposing counsel).
98See, e.g., Comm. on Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Arizona, Op. 93-14
(1993) (stating in a dissent that in a situation where it was unclear how an inadvertently
disclosed tape was found, the matter should be pursued through proper motion to a court).
9
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the opposing attorney has received such documents.99 Therefore, one
attorney is not given an unfair strategic advantage. 1°° The ABA also
recommends that if a dispute exists about the proper resolution of the
documents, a court should give a definitive resolution. 101 Therefore, the
Massachusetts Bar Association opinion highlights the need for one
Model Rule discussing both inadvertent disclosure and unsolicited
disclosure of privileged and confidential documents so that all pertinent
issues are analyzed and appropriate recommendations are made
accordingly.
Another instance of a bar association failing to distinguish between
an inadvertent disclosure and an unsolicited disclosure is a Montana Bar
Association opinion.102 The Ethics Committee of the State Bar of
Montana discussed a situation where an attorney hired a private
detective to conduct activity checks on the plaintiffs. 10 3 The attorney
specifically instructed the detective not to contact the plaintiffs under a
pretext. 104
Nonetheless, the detective did contact the plaintiffs under a pretext
and passed information he gathered to the attorney.105 In its analysis, the
Montana Committee relied on a modified version of the ABA Formal
Opinion on unsolicited disclosure.1 06 Unfortunately, the Montana

9ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382 (1994).
100
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
101See generally part IV.
10 Ethics Comm. of the State Bar of Montana, Op. 951229 (1995). The attorney presenting
the ethical questions was defending a personal injury suit. Id.
10 See also Stagg v. New York Health and Hosp. Corp., 556 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (2d Dept.
1990) (finding that in this personal injury case, because there was no proof that counsel for
the defendant either directly or through communications with the detective agency
instructed the detective to speak with the plaintiff, the plaintiff failed to sustain his claim of
ethical violations against the defense attorney); Barham v. Turner Constr. Co. of Tex., 803
S.W.2d 731, 739 (Tex. App. 1990) (finding that the attorney did not violate a disciplinary
rule because the attorney did not instruct the investigator to contact the plaintiffs).
104Ethics Comm. of the State Bar of Montana, Op. 951229 (1995).
U0 Id. However, the Montana Committee stated that had the attorney directed the detective
to talk with the plaintiffs, Rules 4.2 and 8.4 would have been violated. Id. See MONT. CT.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (providing in part "[in representing a client, a
lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter"); MONT. CT. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 (providing in part "[i]t
is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to.. .violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct").
106
Ethics Comm. of the State Bar of Montana, Op. 951229 (1995). The Montana Committee
also relied on Stagg and Barham. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. See also ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382 (1994). The State Bar of
Montana petitioned the Supreme Court of Montana to adopt the ABA Model Rules of
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Committee incorrectly discussed the situation as an inadvertent
disclosure. 1°? The Montana Committee stated that "based loosely on the
inadvertent disclosure procedure, and considering the factual situation
before us" the attorney must notify opposing counsel that he has
received the information and that judicial review is needed to determine
the extent of the use of the information. 08 Fortunately, the Montana
Committee determined that the attorney must refrain from using such
information until a court decides the disposition of the materials. 1°9 The
Montana Committee limited the procedure discussed in its opinion to
situations where, an investigator contacts an opposing party and then
gives this information to the hiring attorney against an attorney's express
instruction. 110
In this situation, even though the Montana Committee followed the
ABA Formal Opinion it failed to correctly identify the situation as an
unsolicited disclosure. Thus, other attorneys practicing in Montana who
encounter the same situation may misapply the Committee's opinion to
their situation."' Similarly, Montana courts may incorrectly apply an
inadvertent disclosure analysis to similar facts instead of an unsolicited
disclosure as promulgated by the ABA Formal Opinions and therefore, a
court may fail to consider that the receiving attorney may have a
legitimate claim to the documents. 112 However, because there are two
ABA Formal Opinions on closely related topics, an attorney, bar

Professional Conduct on July 12, 1984. Ethics Committee
<http://www.montanabar.org/directory/committee/ethics.htm>

(March 8,
The Rules

1998)
were

adopted August 2, 1984. Id.
I07 The Committee wrote "[rjesearch in the area of law known as inadvertent disclosure has
revealed a procedure.. .we adopt here." Ethics Comm. of the State Bar of Montana, Op.
951229 (1995). The Committee then cited the ABA Formal Opinion on unsolicited
disclosure and quoted the procedure to follow in the case of an unsolicited disclosure. Id.
108Ethics Comm. of the State Bar of Montana, Op. 951229 (1995). The Montana Committee
stated that the receiving attorney at his or her discretion may or may not disclose to
opposing counsel the substance of the information. Id. Also, the Committee determined
that the attorney need not disclose the information to his or her client. Id. However, if the
attorney does inform the client, and the client does not allow the lawyer to go to court, the
lawyer may withdraw from representation. Id.
109Ethics Comm. of the State Bar of Montana, Op. 951229 (1995). See supra notes 102-108
and
infra notes 110-113 and accompanying text
0
"
Ethics Comm. of the State Bar of Montana, Op. 951229 (1995).
11 See CONsT. OF THE ST. BAR OF MONT. , art. 1II (stating that the purpose of the State Bar of
Montana is to aid the courts in maintaining the administration of justice); Ethics Committee
(March
8,
1998)
<http: //www.montanabar.org/attorneyinfo/rulesandregs/constitution.htm>
11 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382 (1994). See
also infra part I.B.
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association, or court may have difficulty determining which opinion to
follow. Thus, the Montana opinion illustrates the need for one Model
Rule instead of two ABA Formal Opinions. A single Model Rule
provides one clear framework for distinguishing between an inadvertent
113
disclosure and an unsolicited disclosure.
2. Court Opinion
As with bar associations, courts have failed to distinguish between
an inadvertent and unsolicited disclosure. In United Mine Workers of
America, International Union v. Arch Mineral Corporation,114 the District
Court for the District of Columbia did not distinguish between an
inadvertent disclosure of documents and an unsolicited disclosure of
documents. The court refused to speculate on how the documents came
into the plaintiff's hands.115 The court decided that the attorney-client

113See infra part IV.
114 145

F.R.D. 3 (D.D.C. 1992). Id. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 981 (D.C. 1998)
(finding that disclosure of one memorandum waives the attorney-client privilege). The
court reasoned that courts will give no greater protection to those who assert the attorneyclient privilege than what his or her own precautions warrant. Id. at 980. See also Suburban
Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.RD. 254 (N.D. 111.1981) (finding that the
attorney-client privilege could not be applied to documents recovered from a garbage
dumpster by a third party). The court stated that:
Though this case presents a very close question, the court concludes
that consideration of these factors requires that the privilege not be
applied to these documents. The likelihood that third parties will have
the interest, ingenuity, perseverance and stamina, as well as risk
possible criminal and civil sanctions, to search through mounds of
garbage in hopes of finding privileged communications, and that they
will be successful, is not sufficiently great to deter open attorney-client
communication. Furthermore, if the client or attorney fear such
disclosure, it may be prevented by destroying the documents or
rendering them unintelligible before placing them in a trash dumpster.
Id at 261.
1L5
United Mine Workers of Am., Int'l Union v. Arch Mineral Corp., 145 F.R.D. 3, 5 (D.D.C.
1992). The disclosed documents were memoranda that the corporate attorney had prepared
for the corporation that included an analysis of the corporate structure that was relevant to
allegations made by a union against the corporation. Id. The first page of each document
was stamped that it was confidential and an attorney-client communication. Id. The
corporation suggested that the documents were misappropriated. Id. The union stated
that they had received the documents anonymously and by mail. Id. The court stated that
the record is consistent with the court's conclusion that the documents were leaked. Id.
The court determined that the documents were within the attorney client privilege before
the disclosure. Id. The court then stated that where documents are inadvertently disclosed,
that the attorney-client privilege was waived. Id. The court denied that motion to strike
the privileged documents and disqualify counsel. Id.
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privilege was waived because the holder of the documents failed to
16
maintain confidentiality.
In this case, if the court would have followed the ABA Formal
Opinion on inadvertent disclosure, the attorney-client privilege probably
would not have been waived because the Committee has opined that
keeping a client confidence is virtually absolute." 7 However, if the court
followed the ABA Formal Opinion on unsolicited disclosure, and if there
was a legitimate claim that the documents were disclosed under a
whistleblower statute, then opposing counsel could have made use of
the documents." 8 Therefore, this court opinion highlights the need for
one Model Rule establishing that courts should closely examine the facts
to determine if a disclosure is inadvertent or unsolicited. 119 In addition,
if the receiving attorney had clear guidelines concerning his or her

Id. at 6. The court stated that the proponent of the claim of privilege has the burden to
show that the documents were confidential and that the proponent took all possible
precautions to maintain confidentiality. Id. See also In re United Mine Workers of Am.
Employee Benefit Plans Litig., 156 F.R.D. 507, 508 n.2 (D.D.C. 1994) (noting that attorneys
receiving inadvertently disclosed documents discussed their obligations under the case law
and ethical rules). The attorneys concluded that even though their actions were contrary to
the ABA Formal Opinion on inadvertent disclosure, they would investigate the
inadvertently disclosed files. Id. The court noted that this case was unlike the Arch case
because there was no allegation in this case that the documents were "misappropriated".
Id. at 512. The court stated that "[ilt
is unfortunate that counsel seek to take advantage of
opposing counsel's mistake and disregard the ABA Formal Ethics Opinion." Id. The court
further stated that the case law in the Circuit compelled the court to rule in favor of the
receiving attorneys even though the ruling directly conflicted with the ABA Formal
Opinion on inadvertent disclosure. Id. at 512. The court added that it recognized "the
magnitude of plaintiff's discovery error is unprecedented and far exceeds other
'inadvertent disclosures' courts of this Circuit have considered in prior cases." Id.
117 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992)
(opining that confidentiality should be maintained even where the receiving attorney looks
at the documents before discovering that the documents have been mistakenly sent). But
see MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (stating in part that a lawyer may
reveal information to prevent a client from committing a criminal act that is likely to result
in substantial bodily harm or imminent death); Kevin M. Ryan, Reforming Model Rule 1.6: A
BriefEssay From the Crossroadsof Ethics and Conscious, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2065, 2066 (1996)
(proposing an addition to Model Rule 1.6 that a lawyer may reveal information to prevent
an minor client from engaging in acts likely to result in substantial bodily harm or death to
the client). The addition to the Model Rule 1.6 further proposed that the attorney should
reveal information only to the extent needed to prevent the harm and the information
should be revealed only to people who need to know. Id.
"1 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382 (1994)
(stating that under a whistleblower statute, the receiving attorney may have a legitimate
claim to use the documents).
19
'
See generally part IV.
116
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professional responsibilities, then this issue may not have been litigated,
thereby preserving judicial resources. 120
C.

Procedures Recommended by Bar Associations and Remedies Fashionedby
Courts

Once a distinction is made whether a disclosure is inadvertent or
unsolicited, the next step is to provide procedures that attorneys should
follow in each situation. In developing procedures concerning the
inadvertent disclosure of privileged or confidential documents, the ABA
relied on the overarching ethical considerations of the principles of
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege, the law governing
bailments and missent property, and the considerations of common
sense, professional courtesy, and reciprocity. 121 The ABA Committee
weighed the competing considerations of maintaining the confidentiality
of the attorney-client privilege existing between the sending attorney
and his or her client against a receiving attorney's obligation to zealously
represent his or her client.122 The Committee decided not to promote
123
uncontrolled zealous advocacy when an attorney represents a client.
However, in formulating its procedures, the Committee failed to plan for
a situation where the parties' dispute whether the materials
inadvertently disclosed were in fact subject to the attorney-client

12

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992). See

121See

also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§

129 (Tentative Draft No. 2,

1989) (discussing that courts should find no waiver in inadvertent disclosure cases). See
also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 141-42 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a bailment as a delivery in
trust of personal property or goods by a bailor to a bailee). The bailee is responsible to
exercise due care and must redeliver the goods. Id. But see William T. Barker, What About
Inadvertently Disclosed Documents or Information?, 60 DEF. COUNSEL J. 613, 614 (1993)
(criticizing the ABA basing the inadvertent disclosure opinion on the law of bailment
because the intent of the parties creating the bailment cannot be determined).
12 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992).
Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980) (stating in part that
"[the duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client
zealously within the bounds of the law") with MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr

(1997) (containing no such provision).
123See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992). See
also CODE OF ETHICS, ALABAMA STATE BAR AssociATION (1899), reprinted in HENRY S.
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 358 (1953) (stating that an attorney should not have the reputation
of a "rough tongue"). Another duty that the Alabama Code promulgated was that "the
attorneys should try the merits of the cause, and not try each other." Id. See also GEOFFREY
C. HAzARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACICE OF LAW 133 (1978) (discussing the adversary
system and that the system can work, but that the system is sick in its present form).
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privilege. Therefore, the proposed Model Rule will provide such a
procedure. 124
Concerning unsolicited disclosures, the ABA Committee opined that
the lawyer receiving unsolicited privileged or confidential documents
These
has some responsibilities upon receiving such materials. 125
professional responsibilities are consistent with the professional
responsibilities embodied in the Model Rules. 126 Because the receiving
attorney may have a legitimate claim to the disclosed documents, the
Committee stated that its procedure would allow the receiving attorney
time to resort to judicial remedies to determine his or her legal rights to
the documents. 127 However, the ABA Committee failed to provide
procedures to resolve a dispute where it is unclear whether the
documents disclosed were inadvertent or unsolicited. Again, it is
128
necessary for a Model Rule to provide such a procedure.
Suprisingly unlike the ABA, state bar associations opinions fail to
analyze and weigh complex policy issues when developing procedures

124See generally part IV.
125 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382 (1994). See
also CODE OF ETHIcS, ALABAMA STATE BAR AssOcLATION (1899), reprinted in HENRY S.
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 355 (1953) (stating that "[tihe attorney's office does not destroy the
man's accountability to the Creator, or loosen the duty to obedience to law, and the
obligation to his neighbor; and it does not permit, much less demand, violation of law").
126 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.6 (1997). See, e.g., Dondi Properties
Corp. v. Com. Savings and Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 287 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (adopting
standards of practice based on the Dallas Bar Association's "Guidelines of Professional
Courtesy" and "Lawyers Creed"). The standards state in part that "a lawyer must be ever
conscious of the broader duty to the judicial system that serves both attorney and client."
Id. Also, "[a] lawyer unquestionably owes, to the administration of justice, the
fundamental duties of personal dignity and professional integrity." Id.
17 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 382 (1994). The
ABA Committee further opined that courts may grant injunctive relief to the sending party
restraining disclosure to protect trade secrets or other privileged materials. Id. See also
American Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 575 N.E.2d 116, 119 (Ohio 1991) (enjoining
defendant from disclosing trade secrets, confidential information, matters of attorney-client
privilege, or work product). The car company retained the defendant as an attorney and
the company contended that the defendant took confidential and privileged materials
without authority. Id. at 118. See also DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDES
695 (1973) (discussing factors necessary to determine whether information is secret, such as
whether the information is confidential and whether the information is sufficiently unique
to warrant protection). A trade secret is valuable because it is secret. Id. If an employee
divulges a trade secret, the employee or his or her new employer may be liable for profits
made from using the trade secret, possibly under the theory of a constructive trust. Id. at
696.
12 See generallypart IV.
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that attorneys should follow when an inadvertent or unsolicited
disclosure occurs. 129 Instead, state bar associations promote zealous
representation of a client and fail to analyze the competing principle of
confidentiality. 13 Thus, the resulting procedures promulgated by these
state bar associations allow attorneys to examine and use the disclosed
documents.131 Additionally, state bar associations analyze inadvertent
and unsolicited disclosure situations using a formalistic interpretation of
the disciplinary rules adopted by the state. 132 State bar associations
using such an interpretation have generally concluded that if the
adopted rules do not specifically address an inadvertent or unsolicited
disclosure of documents, then the attorney has not violated any rule by
looking at or using a disclosed document. 133 Thus, these bar associations
also promulgate procedures that allow attorneys to examine or use the
disclosed documents.134 Significantly in contrast, state bar associations

129 See, e.g., Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 97-1 (1997) (citing no case law in its

analysis); Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Op. 89-53 (1989) (showing where the opinion written
in the form of a letter does not cite case law and provides no policy analysis).
130See infra notes 138-151 and accompanying text. See also Standing Comm. on Professional
and Judicial Ethics State Bar of Michigan, Op. CI-970 (1983) (referencing disciplinary rules
dealing with relevance and admissibility of evidence in a situation where an attorney came
into
possession of an internal private memorandum).
131 See Edward A. Carr & Allan Van Fleet, ProfessionalResponsibilityLaw in Multijurisdictional
Litigation: Across the Country and Across the Street, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 859, 863-67 (1995)
(stating that in an adversary system, zealous representation is the defining characteristic in
the system). However, this can present problems in multijurisdictional litigation where
there may be intrajurisdictional differences of a lawyer's professional responsibilities). Id.
at 863-69. See also DAVID E. SCHRADER, ETHics AND THE PRACTICE OF LAw 208 (1988)
(discussing that because lawyers have a great store of highly useful information provided
by their clients due to a guarantee of confidentiality, a question arises whether this should
be disclosed to opposing parties). Professor Schrader then contends that the reason that
this information is given to attorneys in the first place is because of the attorney-client
privilege and rules protecting confidentiality. Id. at 109.
132See infra notes 152-167 and accompanying text.
133See, e.g., Maryland State Bar Ass'n, Op. 89-53 (1989) (stating that where an attorney
received a copy of a document from an unknown person dealing with a case he was
working on, the receiving attorney had no duty to disclose to the court or defendant receipt
of the document); Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm., Guidance Inquiry
91-19 (1991) (deciding that where an attorney's client provided the attorney with a copy of
a letter from opposing counsel that was mixed in with other documents, the receiving
attorney did not have to inform opposing counsel of receipt of the document); Philadelphia
Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm., Guidance Inquiry 94-3 (1994) (deciding that
where an attorney had inadvertently received a fax, failure to return the document was not
a violation of the disciplinary rules); Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm.,
Guidance Inquiry 94-15 (1994) (deciding that where a corporate attorney had received a
confidential document inadvertently produced, the attorney could photocopy the
documents and only had to disclose receipt of the document to their client and no one else).
3
m See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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following the ABA Formal Opinions or a modified form of the ABA
Formal Opinions look beyond the black letter law of the adopted
disciplinary rules. 135 These state bar associations consider underlying
policy issues not specifically addressed in the rules and usually adopt
procedures similar to the ABA procedures. 136
The following Subsection presents an analysis of state bar
association opinions failing to follow the ABA's Formal Opinions
procedures. Using the same facts that were presented to the state bar
association, another analysis will be presented using the ABA's Formal
Opinions procedures. This analysis will show the need for a new Model
Rule that addresses the shortcomings of the ABA's Formal Opinions
procedures even if the state bar associations had followed the ABA's
137
Formal Opinions procedures.
1.

State
Bar
Association
Representation

Opinions

Promoting

Zealous

An instance of a bar association failing to follow the ABA Formal
Opinion procedure is the District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics
Committee. 138 The District of Columbia Committee emphasized the
zealous representation of a client over the duty to protect confidential or
privileged documents. 139 The situation before the Committee was a

w See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n Ethics Committee, Op. E-374 (1995) (relying on the ABA
Formal Opinion, stating that lawyers who receive inadvertently disclosed privileged
materials are not subject to discipline for receiving the materials, but should return the
materials); North Carolina State Bar, Op. RPC 252 (1997) (concluding that because an
attorney has a duty of honesty and courtesy to all persons involved in the legal process, the
attorney is required to return an inadvertently disclosed file); Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n
Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Op. 94-11B (1994) (stating that
where a government attorney has inadvertently sent a privileged document to opposing
counsel, the attorney-client privilege of the sending attorney was not waived and that
opposing counsel can be precluded by a motion in limine from using the documents as
evidence); Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. 95-57 (1995) (deciding that the privilege is not waived where a fax was
inadvertently transmitted to opposing counsel because the interest of protecting the
privileged communication outweighed the receiving lawyer's interest in retaining such
documents); Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Informal Op. 95-101A (1995) (following procedures outlined in the ABA
Formal Opinion on inadvertent disclosure).
3
1 6 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
'3 See generally part IV.
118District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 256 (1995).
'3 Id. See also Wichita Land & Cattle Co. v. Am. Fed. Bank, 148 F.R.D. 456 (D.D.C. 1992)
(relied on by the District of Columbia Committee in making their decision). The court in
Wichita said it was not important whether the attorney-client privilege was waived

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol33/iss2/6

Kristopek: To Peek or Not to Peek: Inadvertant or Unsolicited Disclosure of

1999]

TO PEEK OR NOT TO PEEK

671

securities arbitration matter where the claimant's lawyer provided the
respondent's lawyer with unrestricted access to a substantial number of
documents. 14° After the respondent's attorney identified documents, the
claimant's lawyer copied and delivered the documents. 141 The claimant's
lawyer then informed the respondent's lawyer that some of the
handwritten
documents
contained
privileged
attorney-client
communications.142
In its analysis of the facts, the Committee stated that once the
documents were read, the disclosed information was part of the body of
knowledge of the receiving attorney.143 The Committee determined that
the receiving attorney could use the information to the advantage of his
or her client. 144 Thus the Committee's resulting procedure promoted the
zealous representation of the receiving attorney's client over protecting

voluntarily or inadvertently. Id. at 458. The court stated that "liberal application of waiver
discourages organizations from broadly labeling materials 'privileged.'" Id. at 462. The

court granted the motion to compel production of the documents. Id. Other case law the
District of Columbia Committee relied on was Resolution Trust Corp. v. First of Am. Bank,
868 F. Supp. 217 (W.D. Mich. 1994). District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 256
(1995). See infra notes 172-178 and accompanying text. The District of Columbia
Committee also relied on the Rules of Professional Conduct. District of Columbia Bar Legal
Ethics Comm., Op. 256 (1995). See also D.C. R. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1
(stating that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client"]. The District
of Columbia Committee discussed this rule in relationship to a lawyer's obligation to
protect a client's confidential documents from an inadvertent disclosure. District of
Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 256 (1995). The District of Columbia Committee
stated that if a lawyer inadvertently disclosed documents during a document production,
that that may violate Rule 1.1. Id. See also D.C. R. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1,5(a) (stating that "property.. .shall be safeguarded" that is held by the lawyer). The
District of Columbia Committee relied on this rule and stated that this rule included
safeguarding inadvertently disclosed property. District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics
Comm., Op. 256 (1995). Under Rule 8.4(c) the District of Columbia Committee stated that if
the attorney learns before looking at the document that the release was inadvertent, that
the attorney should return the document unread. Id. See also D.C. R. Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 8.4 (stating that "[i]t
is professional misconduct for a lawyer.. .to engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation"). For a discussion of
Rule 1.6 see infra note 39 and accompanying text.
140 District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 256 (1995).
141

Id.

142Id.

Id. But see C.P. Smith v. Armour Pharm. Co., 838 F. Supp 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (finding
that where an inadvertently disclosed memorandum prepared by counsel for a
pharmaceutical company concerning litigation of inevitability of litigation regarding
allegations that a hemophiliac had contracted human immunodeficiency virus, that the
attorney-client privilege was not waived). The memo was publicly distributed and
published in"a variety of newspapers from Alaska to Florida". Id. at 1575.
144 District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 256 (1995).
14
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the confidentiality of the sending attorney's client. The Committee
stated that protection of the confidentiality of the sending attorney's
client places too much of a burden on the receiving attorney. 145
Additionally, the Committee decided that the sending attorney's mistake
did not violate Rule 1.6.146 The Committee further stated that if the
attorney was under an ethical restraint regarding use of the information,
this may pose a prohibited conflict of interest and could require
147
withdrawal of the attorney.
Alternatively, if the District of Columbia Committee had adopted
the ABA Formal Opinion on inadvertent disclosure, the Committee
would have analyzed the facts differently and promulgated a different
procedure. 148 In this situation, the Committee would have decided that
the principle of confidentiality outweighed the principle of representing
a client zealously. 149 Therefore, under the ABA Formal Opinion, the
receiving attorney should have abided by the instructions of the sending
attorney as to the disposition of the materials. 150 However, even if the
Committee had adopted the ABA Formal Opinion for its analysis, the
opinion would have failed to provide a recommended procedure for
parties to follow if there was a dispute between the parties concerning
whether the materials were protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Once again, this shows the need for a new Model Rule defining
procedures an attorney should follow if there is a dispute about whether
materials are protected by the attorney-client privilege. 151

145Id.

146See D.C. R. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(a) (providing in part that "[e]xcept
when permitted.. .a lawyer shall not knowingly... [rieveal a confidence or secret of the
lawyer's client"). The District of Columbia Committee, discussing the ethical obligations of
the sending attorney to protect the client's confidential documents from inadvertent
disclosure, stated that where the disclosure was truly inadvertent, and the attorney did not
know that privileged material was contained in the disclosure, there was no violation of the
rule. See also District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 2 5 6 (1995). See also D.C. R.
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(e) (stating in part "[a] lawyer shall exercise
reasonable care to prevent the lawyer's employees, associates, and others whose services
are utilized by the lawyer from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of a client"). See
also District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 256 (1995) (stating that if the
receiving attorney failed to exercise reasonable caution to prevent employees from
disclosing confidences, this would violate Rule 1.6(e)).
147 See District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 256 (1995).
148
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992).
149Id.
1

Id.

151See generally part IV.
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State Bar Associations Following a Formalistic Rule-Based
Analysis

A state bar association not following the ABA Formal Opinions
procedure is the Professional Ethics Commission of Maine (hereinafter
Maine Commission). 15 2 The Maine Commission followed a formalistic
rule-based approach in its analysis of a receiving lawyer's obligations
concerning an inadvertently disclosed document.15 3 The situation before
the Maine Commission was that during pretrial discovery, one attorney
received a number of documents including one document that was
clearly privileged.5l 4 According to the facts, the receiving attorney knew
or should have known that the disclosure was inadvertent.ss
Following a rule-based approach in its analysis, the Maine
Commission used the Maine Bar rules as the standard for ethical conduct
in Maine, and therefore the Commission was not allowed to add ethical
limitations not expressed in the Rules, because the purpose of the Rules
was to establish a codified set of standards for attorneys.15 6 Furthermore,
152Maine Professional Ethics Comm'n, Advisory Op. 146 (1994). In correspondence from
the Board of Overseers of the Bar to the author, it was noted that "Maine's advisory
opinions describe minimally accepted conduct for attorneys under the Maine Bar Rules for
a given fact pattern without the benefit of an adversary process. Different facts may result
in an entirely different finding. Thus, I suggest the enclosed opinion be used with an
awareness of its rule and source." Letter from Geoffrey S. Welsh, Assistant Bar Counsel,
Board of Overseers of the Bar to Gloria Kristopek, author (Dec. 29, 1977) (on file with
author).
153 The Maine Commission determined that the applicable Maine Bar Rules were 3.2(0(3)
and 3.2(0(4). Maine Professional Ethics Comm'n, Advisory Op. 146 (1994). See ME. R. CPR
Rule 3.2(0(3) (providing in part "[a] lawyer shall not.. .engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation"); ME. R. CPR Rule 3.2(0(4) (providing in
part "[a] lawyer shall not.. .engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice"). The Maine Commission stated that there was nothing in the history of Rule
3.2(0(3) indicating that this rule should prohibit an attorney from using and retaining a
document mistakenly but voluntarily sent by opposing counsel. Maine Professional Ethics
Comm'n, Advisory Op. 146 (1994). The Commission further stated that if the receiving
attorney used and retained the inadvertently disclosed document, it was not deceitful,
dishonest, or fraudulent "to take advantage of the mistake of opposing counsel." Id. Also,
the Maine Commission determined that there was nothing in the history of 3.2(0(4) that
suggested that this rule should apply to the situation that was before the Maine
Commission. Id. The Maine Commission determined that as long as the use of the
document was permitted by the Rules of Evidence of Procedure, use of the document was
not prejudicial to the adversary system of litigation. Id.
154Maine Professional Ethics Comm'n, Advisory Op. 146 (1994).
M Id.
L56 Id. See also ME. R. BAR Rule 11 (b)(1), (b)(2) (providing in part that the Professional
Ethics Commission "[sihall render advisory opinions to the Court, Board, Bar Counsel and
to the Grievance Commission on matters involving the interpretation and application of

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1999

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 [1999], Art. 6

674 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
the Maine Commission opined that while the approach and
interpretation taken by the ABA concerning the inadvertent disclosure of
documents was theoretically appealing, they concluded that this
approach was not appropriate for the Maine Commission.15 7 The
Commission concluded that the receiving attorney may use the
documents. 1s8 The Maine Commission advised the receiving lawyer to
notify the sending lawyer of receipt of the inadvertently disclosed
document and to send a copy of the document to the sending lawyer if
requested.15 9 The Commission found no support under the Maine Bar
Rules for the sending attorney to return the original inadvertently
disclosed document. 16°
In contrast, three dissenting members of the Maine Commission
took a less black letter law approach to an analysis of the facts. 161 The
dissent stated that even though no specific disciplinary rule requiring the
return of inadvertently disclosed documents exists, the privileged
documents should be returned in cases where it was clear from the

the Code of Professional Responsibility... [and]... [mlay render advisory opinions on ethical
questions posed by attorneys involving the Code of Professional Responsibility"). See also

Board of Overseers v. Rodway, 470 A.2d 790, 791 (Me. 1984) (stating "in fairness to
attorneys who look to them for guidance, the Rules must provide a clear and consistent
articulation of what constitutes appropriate professional standards").
157 The Maine Commission also relied on Aerojet General Corporation v. Transport
Indemnity Ins., 18 Cal.App. 4th 996 (Cal.App.) (concluding that the receiving attorney
could not be sanctioned for receiving inadvertently disclosed documents). See also FDIC v.
Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252 (D. Me. 1992) (finding waiver of privilege when a document was
inadvertently produced and reviewed by opposing counsel).
158Maine Professional Ethics Comm'n, Advisory Op. 146 (1994). The Maine Commission
also criticized the ABA Committee because it did not base its Formal Opinion on
inadvertent disclosure "on any 'black letter of the Model Rules.'" Id. But see ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992) (stating in part that "a
satisfactory answer to the question posed cannot be drawn from a narrow, literalistic
reading of the black letter of the Model Rules").
L"Maine Professional Ethics Comm'n, Advisory Op. 146 (1994). See also ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992).
160 Maine Professional Ethics Comm'n, Advisory Op. 146 (1994). See also ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 356 (West 1998) (providing that "[a] person is guilty of theft if... [h]e obtains
or exercises control over the property of another which he knows to have been lost or
mislaid or to have been delivered under a mistake as to the identity of the recipient.") The
Maine Commissions also discussed that under the theft of property statute, § 356 may
apply in an inadvertent disclosure situation. Maine Professional Ethics Comm'n, Advisory
Op. 146 (1994). However, the Maine Commission then stated that the jurisdiction of the
Commission was expressly limited to an interpretation of the Maine Bar Rules and not an
interpretation of statutes. Id. Therefore, the Maine Commission advised the receiving
attorney to notify the sending attorney of receipt of the privileged documents. Id.
161Maine Professional Ethics Comm'n, Advisory Op. 146 (1994).
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circumstances that the disclosure was unintended. 162 Moreover, the
dissent stated that an attorney should request a court for instruction on
how to proceed where it was unclear whether an opponent's inadvertent
disclosure gave rise to an ethical duty to keep the information
confidential. 163
If the Maine Commission had relied on the ABA Formal Opinion on
inadvertent disclosure, the Commission's recommendations would have
differed in that the receiving attorney clearly should not have examined
the documents because the receiving attorney knew that the documents
were not intended for him or her. 164 Because the Maine Commission
took a black letter law approach to the analysis, the sending attorney and
the sending attorney's client have paid a high penalty for a mere slip; if
the Maine Commission had followed the ABA Formal Opinion, both the
sending attorney and sending attorney's client would not have paid such
a high penalty. 165 Therefore, this emphasizes the need for a Model Rule
delineating a procedure that fairly weighs the interests of the sending
attorney's client. 66 The Model Rule should preserve the attorney-client
privilege so that the client of the sending attorney is not unfairly
punished because their attorney has made a mistake.1 67 In order to

162 Id. The dissent.noted that several Maine Commission members indicated that they
would returned the inadvertently disclosed documents if requested. Id. However, the
dissent further noted that because there were no disciplinary rules specifically requiring
otherwise, the same members felt that they should follow their client's wishes regarding
retention of the documents. Id. But see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992) (recommending that the receiving attorney notify the
sending attorney of receipt of the documents and that the sending lawyer should abide by
the instructions of the sending lawyer, not the instruction of the receiving lawyer's client).
163 Maine Professional Ethics Comm'n, Advisory Op. 146 (1994). This recommendation
goes beyond the ABA Formal Opinion on inadvertent disclosure and is more in line with
the recommendations of the ABA Formal Opinion on unsolicited disclosure. See also ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992); ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994) (stating that the
procedures suggested in an unsolicited disclosure situation would allow opposing counsel
reasonable time and opportunity to resort to judicial remedies to determine legal rights).
'6 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992).
165See Maine Professional Ethics Comm'n, Advisory Op. 146 (1994) (stating that the rules
also do not prohibit an attorney from taking advantage of any other mistake of opposing
counsel such as a failure to plead an affirmative defense, assert a counterclaim, argue a
theory of law, assert an evidentiary objection at trial, introduce an essential piece of
evidence or demand an important provision during contract negotiations). But see ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992) (stating that
loss of confidentiality is a high penalty to pay for a slip made by opposing counsel).
'6 See infra part IV.
167 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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further understand why a new Model Rule is needed, one must next
examine court opinions and the remedies fashioned.
3.

Court Opinions

Courts examine waiver of the attorney-client privilege in an
inadvertent disclosure situation as an evidentiary question. 168 Remedies
fashioned by courts, where the privilege was not waived, comprise
ordering destruction of the documents, ordering return of the
documents, and issuing protective orders. 169 The cases Resolution Trust

168

See supra part II. C.

remedy is a means by which a right is enforced or the violation of a right is
compensated, redressed, or prevented. See BLACK'S LAw DIcIoNARY 1294 (6th ed. 1990).
The law of remedies is concerned with "the nature and scope" of relief that the plaintiff
should receive once the plaintiff has followed the proper procedure in court and has a
substantive right. See DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 1 (1973). See also
John T. Hundley, Waiver of Evidentiary Privilege by Inadvertent Disclosure-State Law, 51
A.L.R.5th 603 (1997) (stating that once the opposing counsel has received privileged
information that some courts find that unless counsel is disqualified from the case, they
may use the information to his or her client's advantage). However, other courts have
found that opposing counsel should not be disqualified unless there is some culpability on
the receiving attorney's part). Id. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. See Aerojet
General Corp. v. Transp. Indem. Ins., 18 Cal. App. 4th 996, 1006 (Cal.Ct.App. 1 1993)
(stating that once the receiving attorney received the information that his professional
obligation demands that he use the information on his client's behalf). The court also
stated that the attorney-client privilege "is not an insurer against inadvertent disclosure."
Id. at 1004. See American Express v. Accu-Weather, Inc.; No.91 Civ. 6485, 1996 WL 346388,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (showing where the attorney was sanctioned for reading a privileged
document inadvertently sent by opposing counsel after opposing counsel had notified the
receiving lawyer of the mistake and opposing counsel asked for return of the document);
General Accident Ins. Co. v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 483 So. 2d 505, 506 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986) (disqualifying an attorney because lower the court trial judge had
inadvertently forwarded documents to the attorney). The receiving attorney had reviewed
the file not realizing that the file had been sent inadvertently. Id. The court stated that
even though disqualification of the attorney is an extraordinary remedy that perceptions
are of the utmost importance. Id. The court further stated that it could not measure the
advantage the inadvertent disclosure gave one party, but that such an advantage
warranted resort to the extraordinary remedy for the "sake of the appearance of justice, if
not justice itself, and the public's interest in the integrity of the judicial process." Id. See
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co. v. Servotronics, Inc., 132 A.D.2d 392, 401 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1987) (deciding that a bank inadvertently disclosing documents did not waive the
attorney-client privilege). However, the court rejected the view that an attorney may never
waive the privilege in an inadvertent disclosure because an attorney may possess authority
to bind his or her client. Id. at 400. See ICI Americas, Inc. v. Wanamaker, CIV. A No. 881346, 1989 WL 38647, * 4 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (finding that an attorney can waive the attorneyclient privilege on behalf of the client by an inadvertent disclosure of documents during
pre-trial discovery). The court granted the plaintiff's motion seeking return of the original
documents. Id. However, the court also decided that the defendants could keep exact
copies of the documents. Id. See Wichita Land & Cattle Co. v. American Fed. Bank, 148
169 A
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Corporation v First of America Bank' 7° and Transportation Equipment Sales
Corporation v. BMY Wheeled Vehicles1 " illustrate examples of remedies
fashioned by courts.
Notably, in Resolution Trust Corporationv. First of American Bank, the
District Court for the Western District of Michigan ordered destruction
of an original letter and all copies and notes of the original letter.'2 The
court stated that the attorney sending the letter did everything
reasonably required to protect the attorney-client privilege that attached
to document.1 73 The court essentially agreed with the ABA Formal
Opinions on inadvertent disclosure and unsolicited disclosure. 74
Significantly, even though the court adopted the State of Michigan rules
as its formal rule of ethics, the court declined to follow the Michigan Bar
Association Opinion. 75 The Michigan Opinion states that a receiving
lawyer has no obligation to disclose to the court or to an adverse party

F.R.D. 456, 462 (D.D.C. 1992) (granting the motion to compel production of documents).

The court reasoned that once the documents were disclosed, that any privilege that the
documents may have had was waived. Id. at 461. See Ranney-Brown Distrib., Inc. v. E.T.
Barwick Indus., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (ordering an in camera review of
inadvertently disclosed documents to determine whether the documents were privileged);

International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 450 (D. Mass. 1988)
(denying the plaintiff's motion for a protective order compelling defendant to return copies
of inadvertently disclosed documents subject to the attorney-client privilege). See Farm
Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Huether, 454 N.W.2d 710 (N.D. 1990) (deciding that the attorneyclient privilege was not waived where the document was inadvertently disclosed).
170 868 F. Supp. 217 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
17 930 F. Supp. 1187 (N.D. Ohio 1996).

See Resolution Trust Corp., 868 F. Supp. at 221. The court stated that even though it
ordered that the original letter and all copies of the letter be destroyed that the remedy may
be ineffective because opposing counsel and the client had already read the document. Id.
The court further stated that the remedy fashioned will at least prevent the document from
being used at depositions and trial. Id. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for
sanctions. Id.
173 Id. at 220. The court stated that in this case, the document was dearly marked as
privileged and was sent by the attorney, not the client. Id. The court further stated that as
soon as the sending attorney knew of the inadvertent disclosure, the sending attorney
immediately took steps to rectify the disclosure. Id.
174Id. The court stated that common sense, the importance of the attorney-client privileged,
and ethics should have caused the receiving attorney to notify the sending attorney of the
mistake. See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368
(1992).
175 See Resolution Trust Corp, 868 F. Supp. at 220. See also Michigan Standing Comm. on
Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. CI-970, (1993) (deciding one of the first ethics opinions
on misdirected documents.) The Michigan Bar Association has coded its opinions. See also
State
Bar
of
Michigan,
Common
Citations
(Sept.
16,
1997)
<http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/>
"CI" is an informal ethics opinion
interpreting the Michigan Code of Professional Responsibility. Id.
i72
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that he or she possesses the opposing party's confidential or privileged
documents. 176 Moreover, in this case the court went beyond the ABA
Formal Opinion on inadvertent disclosure by ordering destruction of the
original letter, all copies and notes. 177 This case represents the need for a
Model Rule not allowing destruction of documents, but allowing a party
to petition a court for an in camera review of the documents, and if
178
necessary, place the documents under seal.
In another significant court opinion, the District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio in TransportationEquipment Sales Corporationv.
BMY Wheeled Vehicles, 179 relied in part on the ABA Formal Opinion on
inadvertent disclosure in ordering the return of an inadvertently
disclosed document during pre-trial discovery. Even though the sending
attorney only asked for return of the inadvertently disclosed document,
the court ordered no further use of the document and ordered all
persons aware of the contents of the document to deliver all copies of the
document to the court to be kept under seal. 18o Also, the court ordered

176See

Michigan Standing Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. CI-970, (1993)
(deciding that the mere possession of opposing counsel's internal document does not
require the receiving attorney to withdraw from the representation of the client).
1
7 See Resolution Trust Corp, 868 F. Supp. at 221. See also Hebert v. Anderson, 681 So. 2d 29
(La. Ct. App. 1996) (ordering destruction of inadvertently disclosed document subject to
attorney work product privilege). But see Dyson v. Amway Corp., 1990 WL 290683, *3
(W.D. Mich 1990) (finding in an inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents that the
privilege was waived). In determining if the privilege was waived, the court used a five
factor analysis of reasonableness of precautions taken to prevent disclosure, how much
time was taken by the sending attorney to rectify the situation, the scope of the discovery,
the extent of the disclosure, and the interests of justice. Id. But see Fox v. Massey-Ferguson,
Inc., 172 F.RD. 653 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (finding that the privilege was waived in an
inadvertent disclosure based the factors of the reasonableness of precautions taken, the
number of inadvertent disclosures, the magnitude of the disclosure, measures taken to
mitigate the damage of the disclosures, and the overriding interests of justice).
178
See generally part IV.
19 930 F. Supp. 1187 (N.D. Ohio 1996). The court stated that disclosure of the document
was not willful, but resulted from oversight and mistake. Id. The court stated that many
courts have held that an inadvertent disclosure waives the attorney-client privileged, but
that this approach would only condone distrust and animosity among lawyers. Id. See also
Milford Power Ltd. Partnership v. New England Power Co., 896 F. Supp. 53, 60 (D. Mass.
1995) (finding that inadvertent production of documents did not waive the attorney-work
product privilege). The court ordered return of copies of documents to the sending
attorney, and ordered the receiving attorney to destroy all copies of notes and other
materials containing information derived from the privileged documents). Id.
180TransportationEquip. Sales Copr., 930 F. Supp. at 1189. The court stated that the remedy
the sending attorney asked for did not go far enough to protect the receiving attorney's
interests. Id. at 1188. The court stated that it wanted to guard against continuing disclosure
or misuse of the information. Id.
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that a list of all people who knew of the document be kept under seal
with the court.181 The court stated that it fashioned such a remedy to
deter others from using inadvertently disclosed documents protected by
the attorney-client privilege. 182 Thus, the remedy fashioned by this court
went beyond the ABA Formal Opinion procedures. 183
In this case, the court's remedy was almost punitive in nature, and
thus the court may not have fairly weighed the interest of the defendant
because the defendant's culpability should have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.1 84
Also, the plaintiff received a windfall-type
remedy. 185 Once more, this shows the need for a new Model Rule
18 6
providing a framework that fairly weighs the interests of all parties.
As they stand, the ABA Formal Opinions on inadvertent disclosure
and unsolicited disclosure provide some guidance to other bar
associations and courts. However, the two separate ABA opinions fail to
provide a single framework for bar associations and courts to first
determine whether a disclosure is inadvertent or unsolicited. Thus,
confusion and controversy have resulted. Also, because the ABA Formal
Opinion on inadvertent disclosure fails to address how parties should
proceed if they dispute whether a document is protected under the
attorney-client privilege, additional confusion has resulted. Therefore,
the next Section provides a single Model Rule addressing these issues.

181Id. The court stated that no unsealing of the documents shall occur without notice to the
sending attorney and an opportunity to be heard. Id.
182Id. The court stated that it must fashion a remedy that avoids prejudice to the sending
attorney. Id.
183See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992)
(failing to list destruction of documents in its list of procedures.)
184
See also DAN B. DOBB, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIEs 219-20 (1973) (stating that a
punitive award is criminal in nature and liability should be denied for punitive damages
unless the defendant's culpability is proven beyond a reasonable doubt and punitive
damages have not been shown to have any effect on deterrence). See also Richard W.
Murphy, Superbyifrcation: Making Room for State Prosecutionin the Punitive Damages Process,
76 N.C. L. REV. 463, 498 (1998) (stating that the deterrent effect of punitive damages
probably is not great); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 875 (1998) (stating that punishment is one of the
goals of punitive damages, but in the case of corporations this goal may not be achieved
because blameworthy individuals in a corporation are not punished.)
185See also DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 219-20 (1973) (discussing
that judges may feel uncomfortable about punitive awards because the plaintiff receives a.
windfall).
186
See generally part IV.
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IV. PROPOSED MODEL RULE AND COMMENT

A single Model Rule defining and differentiating inadvertent and
unsolicited disclosure of documents that can be adapted by each state is
needed, because bar associations and courts have failed to distinguish
between these two types of disclosures.187 The distinction is important
because if the disclosure was unsolicited by the receiving attorney, the
receiving attorney may have a legitimate claim to the documents.188
Moreover, the distinction is significant because if the attorney has
received unsolicited, privileged, or confidential documents and believes
that the opposing counsel is assisting in an ongoing crime or fraud, the
receiving attorney should not notify the sending attorney that he or she
has received such documents. 189 Instead, the receiving attorney should
notify the proper authorities such as a law enforcement agency or
court. 19

One rule adopted by all states governing misdirected documents
will reconcile inconsistencies between various bar associations and
various courts. 191 Furthermore, an explicit rule is needed because of the
wide variety of the interpretations of the ABA Formal Opinions by bar
associations and courts. 192 A consistent Model Rule between courts will
reduce forum-shopping in cases where a conflict of law analysis is
applicable. 193 Moreover, lawyers will have a consistent set of rules to
apply in order to clearly determine what procedures they should follow
and what their resulting responsibilities are in such situations.

For a discussion of state bar associations and courts failing to distinguish between an
inadvertent and unsolicited disclosure, see suprapart IH.B.
IMThe ABA has distinguished between these two types of disclosures and has stated that
in an unsolicited disclosure situation, the receiving attorney may have a legitimate claim to
the documents. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. See supra notes 93-94 and
accompanying text for a discussion of a state whistleblower statute.
18 See supra note 76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ABA exception to
disclosing to the receiving attorney that the documents have been received. See also supra
note 39 and accompany text (stating that Model Rule 1.6 also provides exceptions to an
attorney keeping information confidential).
190 For other exceptions where the authorities should be notified even though the
information is purported as confidential, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
191A single rule governing an attorney's conduct is needed for multidistrict litigation,
Department of Justice cases, and civil rights cases. See supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
9 See supra notes 10, 63,114-130,164-186 and accompanying text.
193 For examples of conflicts of rules, see supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
18
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Therefore, the interests of judicial economy are served because litigation
is less likely where clear procedures have been established. 194
This Section proposes a Model Rule providing a single framework
for distinguishing between an inadvertent and unsolicited disclosure.
Once the receiving attorney makes the distinction, the attorney can then
determine which procedure under the Model Rule he or she should
follow and his or her resulting responsibilities. 19 The Comment to the
19 6
Model Rule explains and illustrates each type of disclosure.
Additionally, the Comment explains reasonable precautions that the
sending attorney should take to prevent an inadvertent disclosure. 197
The Comment addresses when an attorney should ask for an in camera
review of the documents by a court.198 Future rights of the parties
concerning the destruction of documents are discussed in the
Comment. 199
Also, the Comment discusses situations where the
receiving attorney should ask the court to order full disclosure of the
inadvertently disclosed documents. 20°
A.

Proposed Model Rule:
Distinguishing Between Inadvertent and
Unsolicited Disclosure and Resulting Professional Responsibilities of the
Receiving Attorney.20 1

(a) When an attorney receives misdirected documents appearing on their face
privileged or confidential, the attorney shall use his or her best professional
judgment to determine whether the documents were an inadvertent disclosure or
an unsolicited disclosure based on the totality of the circumstances. If there is a
dispute whether there is an inadvertent or unsolicited disclosure of documents,
the disputing party shall petition the court for an in camera review of the
documents.

1HSee supranote 16 and accompanying text.
19 See infra part [V.A.
19 See infra part IV.B.
17 See infra part IV.B.
19 See infra part IV.B.
I" See infra part IV.B.
2m See infra part IV.B.
20 This Section is based on ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 92-368 (1992), ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94382 (1994), and ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6. See supra notes 179-186 and
accompanying text discussing a case where the court fashioned a punititive like remedy. If
the court would have followed the proposed Model Rule, the court may have only ordered
return of the documents.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1999

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 [1999], Art. 6

682 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
(b) Inadvertently disclosed documents are confidential or privileged documents
received from opposing counsel that are clearly not intended for the receiving
lawyer and apparently sent to the receiving attorney by mistake. Therefore, the
receiving attorney can reasonably determine that such documents are
inadvertently disclosed. If an inadvertent disclosure occurs, the receiving
attorney is precludedfrom using the information disclosed in the documents to
the receiving attorney's client's advantage unless a court determines otherwise
as discussed in paragraph eight. Furthermore, the receiving attorney has a
professional responsibilityto:
(1) stop examining the documents upon realizing that the documents were not
intendedfor the receiving attorney,
(2) notify the sending attorney that the documents were received, and
(3) follow the sending attorney's instructions concerningreturn of the original
documents.2o2
(c) Unsolicited documents are privileged or confidential documents that a
lawyer has received from an anonymous source or a third party who is not the
opposing counsel or the opposing counsel's client. Thus, the receiving attorney
can reasonablydetermine that this is an unsolicited disclosure of documents, not
an inadvertent disclosure of documents. In this situation, the receiving attorney
has a professional responsibility to:
(1) refrainfrom reviewing the documents or review the documents only to the
extent necessary to determine how to proceed,
(2) notify opposing counsel that such materials were sent except as stated in
paragraph(d),

m Michael Alband had inadvertently received documents because the documents dearly
were not intended for him. Michael now has a professional responsibility to stop
examining the documents, notify the sending attorney, and follow the sending attorney's
instructions. However, if there is a dispute concerning whether the documents are
protected by the attorney-client privilege, he should petition a court for an in camera
review of the documents. If Michael believes that the documents contain information
where the sending attorney's client is likely to commit an act resulting in imminent death
or substantial bodily harm, Michael should petition a court for full disclosure of the
documents. See supra notes 164-167. In the Maine situation, the sending attorney's client's
confidences would have been protected unless the receiving attorney had reason to believe
that the sending client was going to commit an act likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm.
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(3) follow the instructions of opposing counsel unless there is a dispute
concerning whether the receiving attorney has a legitimate claim to the
documents,
(4) and refrainfrom using the documents except as stated in paragraph(e).
(d) An attorney who has received unsolicited documents disclosed by a third
party should not notify opposing counsel of receipt of the documents, but should
consult a court or a law enforcement authority where the receiving attorney has
reason to believe that the documents disclose:
(1) criminal activity that is likely to result in substantial bodily harm or
imminent death, or
(2) ongoing crime orfraud that opposing counsel is assisting.
(e) An attorney who has received unsolicited documents disclosed by a third
party may have a legitimateclaim to the documents where:
(1) the third party was acting under a state orfederalwhistleblower statute,or
(2) the documents were improperly withheld and should have been disclosed by
opposing counsel in response to a discovery request.2°3
B.

Comment
Illustrations

[1) The attorney must use his or her best professional judgment to determine
whether an inadvertent disclosure or an unsolicited disclosure has taken place.
This judgment is based upon his or her comprehensive understanding of the

See supra notes 89-101, 113 and accompanying text. Based on the text of the proposed
Model Rule and illustrations, the Massachusetts Committee and the Montana Committee
would have correctly identified the situations as unsolicited disclosures and would have
correctly determined professional responsibilities for unsolicited disclosures. Having both
types of disclosures in one rule would have helped the Massachusetts Committee and
Montana Committee correctly distinguish between the two types of disclosures. The same
reasoning applies for the court case discussed supra. See supra notes 114-117. See supra note
2. Anne Brown's situation is an unsolicited disclosure case because the investigator was
acting as a third party and gave the documents to Anne unsolicited. Anne may have a
legitimate claim to the documents because she had asked for the documents during
discovery and did not receive them. Also, if the investigator is acting to rectify a wrong
because opposing counsel did not disclose the documents, he may be protected under a
state or federal whistleblower statute. Currently because there is no Model Rule
concerning inadvertent or unsolicited disclosures, an attorney must check his or her
jurisdiction's law carefully.
2w
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complex nature of the attorney-clientprivilege. An instance of an inadvertent
disclosure of documents is where an attorney receives a fax that has opposing
counsel's name on the cover sheet as the intended recipient of the fax. Another
example of an inadvertent disclosure is where an attorney receives a fax that is
addressed to opposing counsel's client and the fax is from opposing counsel.
Further, an inadvertent disclosure may occur where a large number of
documents are produced and sent to the receiving attorney during pretrial
discovery and documents that are communications between the opposing
attorney and his or her client are included with documents that are not
privileged or confidential.
[21 An illustrationof an unsolicited disclosure is where the receiving attorney
did not ask for the documents, but a third party delivered documents to the
receiving attorney. Here the third party may be acting under a whistleblower
statute and is seeking to rectify unjust or improper conduct. For example, the
documents may contain information concerning government fraud. The
disclosure of these documents promotes the furtherance of the public good where
illegal or unsafe practicesare stopped or prevented. Another illustration of an
unsolicited disclosure is where the receiving attorney asked for the documents
during a production request and opposing counsel did not deliver the
documents. Again, the third party delivered the documents to the receiving
attorney to rectify unjust or improper conduct on the part of opposing counsel.
In this situation, the underlyingpolicy of promoting the full development of the
facts essential to a court finding a fair remedy to a controversy is promoted by
disclosing the unsolicited documents that were improperly withheld.
Reasonable Precautions2°4
[31 To prevent an inadvertent disclosure, the sending attorney shall take
reasonable precautions to ensure that the documents are not inadvertently
disclosed to an unauthorized person. Reasonable precautions are clearly
marking privileged or confidential materials as such; educating support staff to
treat confidential or privileged materials with due care; and having a mechanism
in place separating confidential and privileged documents from other
documents. The sending attorney should also place a disclaimeron all outgoing
documents stating that ifthe documents have been inadvertently sent, the
attorney-client privilege has not been waived at this time and the receiving
attorney shall notify the sending attorney that the document was sent.

204See Thomas J. Leach, Loss of Attorney-Client Privilege Through Inadvertent Disclosure of

Privileged Documents, in ATrORNEY-CLiENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 119 (Vincent S.
Walkowiak ed., 1997).
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Dispute of Attorney-Client Privilege2° 5
[41 Where there is a dispute between the sending attorney and the receiving
attorney whether documents are subject to the attorney-client privilege, the
party asserting the privilege should petition the courtfor an in camera review
of the documents.
Documents inadvertently disclosed should remain
confidential where the client intended to keep the communication confidential.
However, disclosureshould take place as discussed in paragrapheight.
[51 An in camera review of the documents allows both parties to present his or
her case and allows a court to make a fair determination whether or not the
documents are subject to the attorney-clientprivilege.
[61 If the attorney-client privilege is not waived by an inadvertent disclosure,
then the underlying policy of the attorney-client privilege is promoted because
the client is more likely to seek early legal assistance and disclosefully all facts
pertinent to his or her case. Moreover, the client is not punished for a mere
mistake made by his or her attorney. Nevertheless, where the information
reveals that the sending attorney's client is likely to commit an act likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm, the public's interest
outweighs the client's interest in protecting the client's confidentiality of
information.
Inadvertent Disclosureand Sealing Documents 206
[71 When an inadvertent disclosure takes place, the receiving attorney should
not ask the court to order the destruction of the documents. Instead, the
receiving attorney can ask the court for an in camera review and for the court
to order the documents to be sealed. Such documents should not be destroyed
because these documents may be needed in future litigation. By ordering
destruction of the documents, the court may be interfering with future rights of
one of the parties.
Protective Orderand Full Disclosure
[81 When an inadvertent disclosure has occurred, the sending attorney should
ask the court to order return of the documents and issue a protective order. The
receiving attorney should ask the court to order full disclosure of the

2 See supra notes 138-151 and accompanying text.
By promoting the zealous
representation of the receiving attorney's client, the District of Columbia Committee failed
to even mention that the parties should seek a court resolution if there is a dispute if the
materials are protected by the attorney-client privilege.
29* See supra notes 168-178 and accompanying text for a discussion of a court ordering the
destruction of documents.
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inadvertently disclosed documents only in extraordinarycircumstances such as
when the receiving attorney has reason to believe that the documents contain
information that would prevent the sending attorney's client from committing
an act likely to result in imminent death or substantialbodily harm
V.

CONCLUSION

Advanced technology and increasingly complex litigation involving
up to millions of pages of documents have posed many unanswered
questions concerning an attorney's ethical obligations. The ABA has
taken serious steps to begin to answer some of these questions by
examining policy considerations and issuing Formal Opinions on
inadvertent and unsolicited disclosure of privileged and confidential
documents. Yet, many state bar associations have responded differently
to the challenge by taking a formalistic rule-based approach to these
complex problems. Thus, many state bar associations have failed to
consider an attorney's ethical duties in light of preserving confidential
communications between an attorney and client except in rare instances.
This Note seeks to restore protection of confidential or privileged
communications except in limited circumstances where there is an
overriding public policy interest. Effective and ethical representation of
the client is promoted by preserving protection of confidential or
privileged communications. Likewise, the sending attorney's client is
not unjustly punished because his or her attorney has made a mistake.
Additionally, this Note seeks to provide a single framework of
procedures for attorneys to follow should they receive such documents.
Thus, when adopted, the proposed Model Rule and comment can
decrease some of the confusion present in this emerging area of the law.
Gloria A. Kristopek •
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